The Lorikeet Warriors:
East Timorese new generation nationalist resistance, 1989-99

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INTRODUCTION

We imagined that the day would be worse, that it would be our last day. So early in the morning I already had a sample of the voting card [marked for independence]: ‘If I die, please count me.’ I carried that in my wallet. I went to vote in Bemori. And after that we talked, tried to figure out the things that would happen after the announcement [of the result of the vote]. At the time we understood that the militias already made a line around Dili and in different places. At the time we knew they had already made havoc in the districts and that Dili would be their last target to destroy. Many people already left Dili after they voted, and many people already went to the mountains to escape.

Student leader João Sarmento
Recalling 30 August 1999

The UN-supervised Popular Consultation of 30 August 1999 in East Timor must be considered a remarkable act of collective courage and popular nationalist sentiment. After twenty-four years of brutal military occupation and months of intensive intimidation by pro-autonomy militia groups, along with threats of the bloodshed that would follow a vote for independence, an incredible 98.6 per cent of registered voters turned out, and 78.5 per cent of those voted for independence. The vote was the culmination of a twenty-four-year struggle for national liberation.

A great deal has been written about East Timor. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role the East Timorese played in the successful struggle for independence against Indonesian military occupation. In short, their historical agency has been overlooked. Most of the scholarship on East Timorese nationalism and its nationalist movement has examined the period when it first emerged, under

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1 Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001), Side B 62. [Note on the citation of interviews: For the sake of brevity, just this information will be given in footnotes. More information is available in the bibliography. Pinpoints refer to the tapes unless otherwise noted.]

Portuguese colonial rule, in 1974 and 1975.\(^3\) A large section of the subsequent literature has concentrated on the human rights violations resulting from the brutal activities of the military and, more recently, militia groups.\(^4\) Another focus of scholarship on East Timor has been international relations, and the role of western governments and, particularly in light of the 1999 Popular Consultation, the United Nations.\(^5\) Many works since 1999 have simply been first-hand accounts by some of the many foreigners who were in East Timor around the time of the ballot, often interesting as personal accounts but characterised by a low level of research.\(^6\) Much of the work that has examined the resistance of the East Timorese has focused on high profile leaders like Xanana Gusmão\(^7\) and Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo.\(^8\)

Two reasons can be identified for this trend in the scholarship on East Timor. Firstly, with the clandestine system under which the resistance operated, it was difficult to gain access to information about the resistance, and potentially dangerous to publish it. For that reason, the work that did emerge about the resistance has been accounts of individual or small groups of activists in exile,\(^9\) or based on limited

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\(^8\) Arnold S. Kohen, *From the Place of the Dead: Bishop Belo and the Struggle for East Timor* (Oxford: Lion, 1999).

research done under difficult conditions on trips to East Timor. Secondly, the focus of much writing was to expose the mass human rights violations taking place in East Timor, the actions of the Indonesian government and their supporters in western nations, and to push the case for international intervention.

The result is that the actions of the East Timorese have been largely ignored or marginalised. If we examine two recent books on East Timor edited by academics in Australian universities, Guns and Ballot Boxes and Out of the Ashes, less than ten of a total of thirty chapters in the books deal with East Timorese agency: the rest focus on the military and militias, the role of the UN and international implications of the issue. Writing in 1958, Ruth McVey posed the challenge for historians of South East Asia after colonialism: ‘to discern those masses which only showed themselves for confused and violent instants’, that appeared only as ‘objects for improvements, causes for concern, and choruses for new elite.’ Much of the scholarship on East Timor has failed to respond to that challenge.

This thesis is an attempt to respond to that challenge by examining the nationalist struggle of young East Timorese between 1989 and 1999, and specifically what I have called the new generation. The new generation, geração foun in Tetum, is a term used by East Timorese to refer to those who entered adulthood after the Indonesian invasion. Members of the new generation are distinguished by two factors: firstly, they were not part of the original nationalist leadership in Portuguese times which formed the parties Fretilin and UDPT and fought a brief civil war in 1975. Secondly, they grew up under Indonesian occupation and were educated mostly under the Indonesian system. Despite the enormous ethno-linguistic and socio-

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13 The East Timorese lingua franca.
15 Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor, Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente
16 Timorese Democratic Union, União Democrática Timorense
17 Some of the new generation activists I interviewed began their schooling in Portuguese times, but generally only at a low level.
economic diversity among the East Timorese, the unity among young activists brought about by this idea of new generation was extremely strong.

This thesis is a consciously partial view of East Timorese history. Firstly, it is partial in the sense that it is based on the accounts and perspectives of new generation activists. My major sources are thirty-four interviews conducted with activists in East Timor on three trips there in 2000 and 2001, and primary documents produced by various student and youth groups, including conference proceedings and student magazines.\(^{18}\) Sadly, most of the documents and publications activists had produced were destroyed, along with so much else, in September 1999. Where possible, the information contained in the interviews has been compared with more conventional sources in order to confirm their accuracy. However, the analysis of East Timorese history comes, above all, out of the primary sources.

Secondly, it is partial in the sense that it does not attempt to be a comprehensive or complete history that fully explains the developments in East Timorese history from 1989 to 1999. External developments, notably diplomatic developments, have largely been ignored except where they led to or from events referred to in the interviews. Nor have I paid great attention to the complex issue of the development of Indonesian military and government policy in East Timor. In spite of this, an account examining solely new generation activism does provide a surprisingly coherent account of East Timorese history during the period.

Thirdly, even as a history of the new generation it is unavoidably incomplete. The documents are all official documents or publications of the youth and student organisations. The interviewees, almost without exception, were leaders of their organisations. In some cases, more junior members of organisations refused to be interviewed, because only their leader was qualified to recount their part of the history.\(^{19}\) This thesis is, therefore, a public history of a clandestine movement, which does not take into account the roles played and sacrifices made by all parts of society, or even of the new generation. Notably, the voice of new generation women is almost absent from this work. Only three of the thirty-four interviewees were women. While this is a historically accurate reflection of the leadership of new generation organisations, this, along with the public nature of the account, serves to marginalise

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\(^{18}\) A list of these sources is provided in the bibliography.

\(^{19}\) This was particularly noticeable outside Dili.
the distinctive role they played within the movement. Regrettably, as often happens in work on nationalist movements, women are left out because, as Begoña Aretxaga points out, they do not fit existing discourses.20

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines the emergence of nationalism and the nationalist movement among the new generation: its impetus in the oppression of the 1970s and 80s, its strong relationship with the old generation nationalist movement, and some of the factors that caused it and allowed it to develop. The second chapter looks at two key phases of the movement: the intifada of 1989-91 and the rebuilding of the movement between 1994 and 1998. This chapter examines the developments that gave the movement its own momentum, particularly the events of 12 November 1991, and the developments in targets, tactics, allies and aims during the period. The third chapter focuses on the events of 1998 to 1999, and the move from reformasi to referendum. The emphasis is this chapter is on the unity within the new generation that prevailed at crucial moments of 1999, even as the movements became more diverse in organisation and programme.

This thesis is a pioneering empirical study of a subject rarely examined with care or detail. It traces the emergence and development of an extraordinary movement in a remarkable time and place. It is a subject with which I have a strong emotional link, having first visited East Timor and met many of the actors in January 1999, and having returned five times since. The study raises many issues for interpretation, such as the role of class, gender, geographic diversity and educational background within the new generation, and between the old and new generations. Some of these issues are explored briefly, others not at all. The focus of this thesis, in the absence of any similar study, is to use the information imparted to me through the interviews and rare documents to begin the process of understanding this subject. I hope that from this beginning, further alternative interpretations and accounts of the subject will follow. One new generation activist finished his interview with these words: ‘the new generation want [it] only to be recognised that freedom cost the lives of many young people, and that the young people did something for this nation’.21 I hope this study can play a role in that process.

21 Interview with Fr Jovito Rego de Jesus Amaral (4/7/2001), 523.
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW GENERATION NATIONALISM

East Timorese resistance was fundamentally nationalist in nature. To analyse this resistance, one must analyse the origins and content of the nationalism that drove it. This chapter examines East Timorese nationalism in the light of contemporary theories of nationalism, and with a focus on the new generation nationalism that emerged to light at the end of the 1980s.

The recent historiography of nationalism has been dominated by the influential work of Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities.*\(^2\) The central point of this work is that the nation can be defined as ‘an imagined political community’\(^3\) a community in the sense that it transcends other differences within society, but one that is imagined because, as in most communities, most of its members will not actually meet. This imagined community is both limited, in the sense that all nations have finite boundaries, and sovereign, in that its aspiration is generally independence from other forms of rule in the form of the sovereign state.\(^4\) The cultural artefact that is nationalism emerged, Anderson argues, because of the coincidence of print technology and capitalist modes of production in Europe towards the end of the eighteenth century.\(^5\) However, nationalism is capable of being transplanted – that is to say it is modular – and thus has spread throughout the world today.\(^6\)

Much of the study of nationalism in colonised countries has hypothesised that it emerged by reference to the colonial state in two complimentary ways: firstly, by taking discourses directly from the colonial state; and secondly, by uniting an indigenous community in opposition to the colonial state. Anderson examines the way in which nationalists use discourses created by the colonial state to define the imagined community. In particular, he examines the census, map and museum,\(^7\) as

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3. Ibid., 6.
4. Ibid., 6-7.
5. Anderson’s is by no means the only conception of the origins of European nationalism, but it is the one most often referred to in the context of anti-colonial nationalism: cf. Peter Sahlins, "The Nation in the Village: State Building and Communal Struggles in the Catalan Borderland During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *JMH* 60 (1988).
7. Ibid., 163-86.
well as the impact of colonial education more broadly, framed as it is the nationalist discourse of the metropole.  

Three slightly different formulations of the way in which nationalism is created in opposition to the colonial state will be mentioned here. Firstly, Partha Chatterjee argues that postcolonial nationalist imaginings are posited ‘on a difference with the “modular” forms of the national society propagated by the modern west’. The true source of the imagined community is the anti-western, pro-indigenous spiritual domain of nationalism. Guinea Bissau anti-colonial revolutionary Amilcar Cabral describes this search for an indigenous difference from western models as ‘an act of culture’. This culture is to be taken from the people, distinguishing the progressive elements from the reactionary. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in a more critical view of nationalism, see one of its few progressive functions as forming a ‘fortified line of defense’ against imperialism and occupation, and a legitimizing device for claims to dignity, independence and equality. They view nationalism as progressive only in the pre-sovereign phase.

Relatively little scholarship has been devoted to studying the emergence and development of East Timorese nationalism under Indonesian occupation. I will briefly examine two analyses. John Taylor regards it as the unbroken continuation of pre-1975, or old generation, nationalism, born in the rapid decolonisation of East Timor by Portugal in 1974-5, and spread by a combination of Fretilin activities in 1975 and as a reaction to the brutal suffering endured by the population following the Indonesian invasion. Benedict Anderson, by contrast, largely disregards the influence of old generation nationalism. He attributes the rapid rise of East Timorese nationalism since 1975 largely to the expansion of the Indonesian state. Firstly, this expansion has led to ‘a profound sense of commonality’ emerging ‘from the gaze of

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30 Ibid., 6.
32 Ibid., 47.
35 Anderson, “Imaging East Timor”.

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the colonial state’. Secondly, it supported the spread of the Catholic Church, which became a part of East Timorese identity. Thirdly, through its education it created a group of young East Timorese fluent in Indonesian through which they found access to the world.

All of the factors has examined by these two historians have some relevance to the emergence of nationalism among the new generation. Neither explanation is entirely satisfactory. New generation nationalism has different forms, depending on the class, educational background, and geographical origins of its various proponents. However, these different strands are united by four factors. These are: the suffering experienced by the new generation in the 1970s and 1980s at the hands of the Indonesian military, which acted as an impetus for action; old generation nationalism, which initially provided the ideological framework of and organisational structure for this action; institutions of state and church, which consolidated this nationalism and provided space for action; and the experiences of the struggle itself, through which the nationalism developed.

SUFFERING AS THE IMPETUS FOR ACTION

The primary impetus for nationalist resistance among the new generation was the extraordinarily brutal Indonesian military occupation. Almost all of the activists I interviewed had been displaced from their homes, lost family members, or suffered themselves at a young age. This brutality began in from the day the full-scale invasion was launched, 7 December 1975, and lasted through much of the 1970s and 1980s. Two military operations in particular stand out as particularly barbarous. In March 1977, the Indonesian military launched the campaign of ‘encirclement and annihilation’. This campaign, which lasted until 1979, included the use of heavy bombing, napalm and chemical sprays aimed at destroying crops. A central part of the campaign was the forced relocation of the population, an estimated two thirds of

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36 Ibid., 27.
37 John Martinkus describes the experiences of student leader Jose Antonio Belo, which are by no means unique: Martinkus, A Dirty Little War, 12.
38 For a compelling account of the day of the invasion, see Jolliffe, East Timor.
39 Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor, 85; Budiardjo and Liem, The War against East Timor, 27. Moving eyewitness accounts can be found in Turner, Telling East Timor.
which had remained under Falintil control until this point, into Indonesian-controlled areas. The combined effect of the massacres, bombardment and mass displacement of the population was staggering: it is estimated that one third of the population died between 1977 and 1979 alone. In 1981, after the remnants of Falintil had re-intensified their struggle using guerrilla tactics under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, the Indonesian military launched the ‘Fence of Legs’ operation. Civilian East Timorese were forced to march in front of the Indonesian military as they hunted for Falintil. Although the operation did not generally succeed in capturing significant numbers of guerrillas, the effect of harsh conditions and further dislocation on the civilians involved took a severe toll.

The effect these experiences had in pushing young East Timorese into action is clear. Student leader Joaquim Fonseca, asked why he became politically involved, said: ‘Most people hate the Indonesian army for various reasons; either because family members or themselves were subjected to bad treatment. In most cases this is the first thing [that motivated people].’ The initial actions of many young activists against the occupation were simply spontaneous expressions of anger such as throwing rocks at military trucks or writing graffiti on walls. This anger was to find organisational and ideological form under the influence of the old generation.

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40 The National Liberation forces of East Timor (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste), the East Timorese resistance army initially aligned with Fretilin, then with CNRM and finally with CNRT.

41 Chomsky and Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, 162.

42 By mid 1979, over 300,000 East Timorese had been forced into fifteen such centres: Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor (London: Tapol, 1979), 87.


44 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001), 453.

45 Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001); Interview with Nelson Belo (28/10/2000).
OLD GENERATION NATIONALISM

Old generation nationalism emerged in the 1970s by reference to the Portuguese colonial state. Prior to the 1970s, although there were frequent uprisings against Portuguese rule,46 no coherent nationalist movement was apparent. The relatively late emergence of East Timorese nationalism has generally been attributed to the lack of investment by Portugal, the weakest of the colonial powers, in the most distant part of its empire.47 In April 1974, left-leaning officers overthrew the Portuguese military dictatorship in what has become known as the Carnation Revolution, and the decolonisation of East Timor was put on the agenda. The East Timorese nationalist movement that emerged at this time was made up of small number of assimilados, so-called assimilated East Timorese, educated in the elite official education system and independent religious schools.48 Many of the leaders had studied at university in Portugal,49 where they were heavily influenced by African anti-Portuguese ideas and struggles such as those in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. This influence is apparent in the name of the largest East Timorese political party, Fretilin, which was closely based on its Mozambique equivalent Frelimo.

The imaginings of old generation nationalism are apparent in the symbols of the struggle adopted by the new generation. Some of these imaginings have their origins in the Portuguese colonial state. For example, the overwhelming majority of resistance organisations take Portuguese names, not Tetum or Indonesian. Student leader Miguel Manetelu described how the early meetings of Renetil in Bali were

46 The two most notable 20th century examples are the rebellion led by Dom Boaventura ending in 1912, and the uprising near Viqueque of 1959, sparked by Indonesian officers involved with the Peremsta revolution in the Moluccas. These conflicts are dealt with in detail in Geoffrey Gunn’s excellent recent work: Geoff Gunn, Timor Loro Sae: 500 Years, Estudos E Documentos. (Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1999).

47 As late as 1973 the annual budget of East Timor was just $A5.5m, only 53% of children aged 6-11 attended school, and the illiteracy rate was estimated to be at least 93%: Hill, “Fretilin”, 49; Jolliffe, East Timor, 53. In April 1974, there were, as Benedict Anderson notes, no local legislature, no political parties, no real independent press, and little sign of decolonisation beginning: Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 130.

48 Despite the small colonial investment in East Timor, the education system had slowly expanded after the Second World War. By 1974 there were over one thousand students in secondary schools in East Timor; Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, 31. The most notable of these were the Jesuit-run school in Soibada, the Jesuit seminary in Dare, in the hills above Dili, and the Liceu in Dili at which, almost without exception, early nationalist leaders were educated. All of the ten founders of Fretilin examined by Helen Hill attended some combination of the three, as did leaders of other early political parties: Hill, “Fretilin”, 72-81.

49 By 1974 there were 39 students from Timor, mostly East Timorese, studying in Portugal, although just twelve graduates by 1975. There were also 25 Chinese Timorese students at university in Taiwan in 1973-74, although they seem to have little involvement with the nationalist movement: Ibid., 48-49.

50 Many words are common to Tetum and Portuguese, and thus it could be argued that the names are also Tetum. However, the words in the organisation names are exclusively Portuguese, including prepositions rarely used otherwise in Tetum. Furthermore, the Portuguese Timor Leste is generally used instead of Timor Lorosa’e.
conducted in Portuguese, which prevented him, as a non-Portuguese speaker, from participating.°

Most nationalist imaginings, however, come out of a difference from the Portuguese colonial state. New generation demonstrations commemorated events such as the Fretilin Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 28 November 1975.°

Most demonstrations were held under the flag raised at the Declaration.° The word *maubere*, originally used by the Portuguese colonists pejoratively to denote an unassimilated East Timorese, then taken up by Fretilin in 1975, became the term used in the resistance to describe East Timorese people. As recently as 2000, a major student conference in Baucau called on *mauberism* to become the unifying ideology of the future independent nation of East Timor.°

The reason for the strong influence of old generation nationalism on the new generation was that early new generation activism took place under the auspices of the older generation. Alberto Arenas describes two distinct kinds of East Timorese resistance among the new generation: individualized, ‘non-ideological’ resistance, and organized collective action.° It was through contact with Falintil that most young East Timorese moved from the former to the latter. Early youth organisations were little more than small cells with little central organisation except through the Falintil members who gave them their instructions. Youth leader Constâncio Pinto described it as such: ‘there was no centralized network for all the different underground groups. Each had its own connections, with David Alex, Mau Hudo, Xanana Gusmão or other guerrilla fighters in the jungle.’° Other new generation activists were brought into the resistance directly through older family members. Elda Guterres Silva, whose

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° Interview with Miguel Manetelu (20/7/2001). Other Renetil members I spoke to did not recall ever conducting meetings in Portuguese.

° Early in 1975, East Timor seemed to be heading peacefully for decolonisation. The two largest parties, Fretilin and UDT had formed an alliance to move East Timor towards independence, with the co-operation of the Portuguese administration. However, the Indonesian government launched a massive destabilisation campaign, initially using the small pro-Indonesian party Apodeti (the Popular Democratic Association of East Timor) and then UDT. In late May, UDT pulled out of the coalition with Fretilin, and on 11 August launched a coup. A brief civil war followed, and by September Fretilin had effective control of East Timor. The Portuguese administration moved to Atauro (a small island to the north of Dili) never to return. The Indonesian strategy now turned to open military aggression. In early October, Indonesian troops (accompanied by East Timorese irregulars in an effort to create the impression of civil war) took the border towns of Batugade and Balibo. As a last ditch effort to draw international attention to its plight, Fretilin unilaterally declared independence on 28 November. Nine days later, on 7 December, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion of Dili.

° For example, East Timorese students marching in the demonstrations in Jakarta that ousted Suharto marched under this flag to show that their distinctive East Timorese identity: Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).

° The author attended the conference, held by the East Timor Student Solidarity Council Matebian region (comprising four of East Timor’s thirteen districts).

° Arenas, “Education and Nationalism in East Timor”: 143.

father was in Falintil, described watching for Indonesian military and lying to visitors about the whereabouts activities of her father while playing in the garden as a young child, and Gregorio Saldanha describes himself as ‘growing up’ with Fretilin.

Old generation nationalism provided the framework for the expression of the anger of the new generation at Indonesian occupation. It was, as Hardt and Negri describe it, the ‘fortified line of defense’, the ‘ideological weapon used’ in their resistance. The expressions of nationalism apparent in new generation resistance against Indonesian imperialism were, especially in their early years of the struggle, taken directly from the nationalism defined by reference to Portuguese imperialism, which most new generation activists had barely experienced. Old generation nationalism was modular, in the sense that it became, virtually unaltered, the political framework used to fight a different anti-colonial struggle.

STATE AND CHURCH INSTITUTIONS

The Catholic Church and the Indonesian education system also played a role in the emergence of new generation nationalism. Both expanded rapidly during the late 1970s and 1980s. As the population became increasingly urbanised in the 1980s, the Indonesian government invested heavily in education: elementary schools increased from 47 to 654 between 1976 and 1993, and high schools from none to 34. In 1986, the University of East Timor (UNTIM) opened with 2100 students and by 1989, 1500 students had scholarships to study at universities in Indonesia. The Catholic Church benefited from the Indonesian government requirement that all citizens follow one of five monotheistic religions, of which Catholicism was the most firmly established in

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57 Interview with Elda Guterres Silva (19/7/2001).
58 Interview with Gregorio Saldanha (18/4/2001).
59 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 106.
60 As a result of the end of Falintil control of any significant amount of the population and the forced displacement from traditional farming lands, the East Timorese population was increasingly located in urban centres. The population of Dili, for example, increased five-fold by 1990: Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 135.
63 This comes from the first principle of the Pancasila, the Indonesian national ideology: “belief in one God”. The five are: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism.
East Timor. At the same time, the church moved from being an arm of Portuguese imperialism to an institution genuinely close to the people.\textsuperscript{64}

These institutions played a role in providing new generation East Timorese with discourses that confirmed their nationalist sentiments. In the education system, as Jacinto dos Santos notes, East Timorese students learnt about the ‘glorious’ struggle of the Indonesian people against Dutch colonialism and the Indonesian constitution, which affirms the right of all people to independence.\textsuperscript{65} Student leader Fernando de Araujo would use the Indonesian constitution in his defence as one of the bases for rejecting the courts jurisdiction over his case.\textsuperscript{66} In the case of the church, Catholicism became what Anderson describes as ‘an expression of common suffering’.\textsuperscript{67} Catholicism became an acceptable mode of difference from the Muslim Indonesian majority, a difference that was emphasised by the use of Tetum, rather than Indonesian, by the church, and the independence of the East Timorese church from the Indonesian hierarchy. However, Anderson may have overestimated the influence of these institutions in the formation of nationalism.\textsuperscript{68} It was the brutality of the state more than its gaze that created the impetus for nationalism, while most of the symbols of nationalism appear to have been taken directly from old generation nationalism.

The major role of these institutions was providing the space for the new generation activism to emerge. Anderson considers this when he comments that the new generation had ‘access to the Indonesian intelligentsia’.\textsuperscript{69} This did become useful for East Timorese students studying in Indonesia later, notably after 1994.\textsuperscript{70} However, the Indonesian education system became important for young East Timorese because, above all, schoolmates began to discuss their situation with each other, consolidate


\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Demurrer by Fernando Araujo}, (1992).

\textsuperscript{67} Anderson, “Imagining East Timor”: 27.

\textsuperscript{68} Many East Timorese are scathing of the Indonesian education system because of its failure to encourage critical thinking. See, for example, Balthasar Kehi, “Education Reform in East Timor: A Philosophical View” (1999).

\textsuperscript{69} Anderson, \textit{The Spectre of Comparisons}, 135.

\textsuperscript{70} See the section on the ‘Indonesianisation’ of the struggle in the next chapter.
their political understanding and begin to take action together. Most activists I spoke to began their political involvement talking with schoolmates.

Church institutions also provided this space. The most notable of these was the Catholic Scouts, which most East Timorese joined instead of the *pramuka*, the Indonesian national scouts. Constâncio Pinto, like many activists, was also a Catholic Scout leader. Church educational institutions were also a space where young East Timorese began to organise on a low level, with many activists attending seminaries but not completing their training as priests.\(^{71}\) While these church institutions did not condone resistance activities,\(^{72}\) many elements of the Church hierarchy did actively support the resistance. Religious rituals also presented an opportunity for protest, and many demonstrations followed mass. Because mass was one of the few times that large numbers of East Timorese could safely gather together, it provided an opportunity for activists to congregate together in the guise of institutions like the Catholic Scouts, and to take their message to large numbers of East Timorese and encourage them into action.

**THE STRUGGLE AS AN ORIGIN OF NATIONALISM**

Finally, new generation nationalism was by no means static during the ten-year period of the struggle examined here. Amilcar Cabral describes the need for struggles of national liberation to develop a ‘national culture’, best developed in the course of the struggle itself.\(^{73}\) Through their own experience of the struggle, and especially the landmark events such as 12 November 1991, the new generation resistance did develop a ‘national culture’ for their generation. This became an integral part of their nationalism, along with the suffering of the 1970s and 1980s, the old generation nationalist imaginings, and the discourses and spaces provided to them by educational and religious institutions.

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\(^{71}\) Interview with Fr Jovito Rego de Jesus Amaral (4/7/2001).

\(^{72}\) João Sarmento recalls being told that anyone found involved in the resistance would be thrown out of the seminary he attended: Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001). Nelson Belo and Antero Benedito da Silva were both thrown out of their seminaries for being involved in the resistance: Interview with Nelson Belo (28/10/2000); Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000).

\(^{73}\) Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 50, 55.
FROM *INTIFADA TO REFORMASI*:
NEW GENERATION RESISTANCE EMERGES

THE EAST TIMORESE *INTIFADA*: TASI TOLU TO SANTA CRUZ

Between 1989 and 1991, the new generation resistance emerged as a movement of significance in East Timor. Such was the intensity of the revolutionary dynamic during this period that some activists refer to it as the East Timorese *intifada*. The movement showed the world that the issue of East Timor was far from resolved, through three major demonstrations that coincided with the visit of three foreign dignitaries to East Timor: Pope John Paul II on October 1989; US Ambassador to Indonesia John Monjo in January 1990; and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Pieter Kooijmans, in November 1991. The demonstrations also had a powerful effect on younger East Timorese, and played a vital role in giving new generation resistance a momentum of its own.

Before 1989, new generation resistance consisted of small, highly clandestine cell-based groups. These were usually small groups of friends or schoolmates with independent links to Falintil and highly decentralized organisation. The 007 group, which is well documented thanks to Constâncio Pinto’s first hand account, is a fine example of this kind of organising. It was founded by seven friends in early 1985 with the approval of Falintil commander David Alex, and gradually grew as other cells, each with one overlapping member, were formed throughout East Timor. Student leader Jose Antonio Belo, then living in Baucau, describes the situation at that time:

> We were trying to find a group. The situation was unsettled: we didn’t know who was friend [and] who was enemy. So we just tried, even four persons, to just talk to each other. Not openly. Even just one person, me and someone else. But then the other people were captured,

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74 See for example, Gomes, *"The East Timor Intifada: Testimony of a Student Activist"*; Pinto and Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance*, 118.
75 Pinto and Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance*, 118.
and I lost my contact with Falintil until 1990, when I found my connection again.\footnote{76} 

In spite of the difficult situation, some larger organisations did emerge towards the end of the 1980s. The activities of these groups were limited to consolidating members’ politics through discussions, and assistance to Falintil, under whose direction they remained. The 007 group developed a centrally organised structure in 1987, and changed its name to \textit{Orgão Oito} (Organ Eight).\footnote{77} Another large youth organisation to emerge at this time was the Organisation of Catholic East Timorese Youth and Students (OBJEJITIL).\footnote{78} This was the major Fretilin youth organisation, led by Gregorio Saldanha.\footnote{79} On 20 June 1988 in Denpasar, Bali, ten East Timorese students formed the National Resistance of East Timorese Students (Renetil), led by Fernando de Araujo.\footnote{80} This organisation then spread to all other cities in Indonesia where East Timorese were studying.\footnote{81} 

In 1988, two formative events took place for new generation activism. Firstly, Indonesian President Suharto opened up the province of East Timor. International visitors would be allowed in for the first time since the invasion.\footnote{82} Secondly, Xanana Gusmão issued an invitation to the youth to continue with their struggle, informing them that ‘in good time, the leadership will request your participation in concrete decisive and daring actions.’\footnote{83} The resistance leadership clearly now saw a distinct role for the youth as the centre of the urban-based clandestine front, which along with Falintil and the diplomatic front formed the three fronts upon which the struggle was to be fought.

\footnote{76}{Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001), 75.} 
\footnote{77}{Pinto and Jardine, \textit{East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance}, 97-98.} 
\footnote{78}{OBJEJITIL would later become OJETIL, the Organisation of East Timorese Youth and Students: Interview with Eladio Faculto (19/7/2001); Interview with Gregorio Saldanha (18/4/2001); cf. Donaciano Gomes, "Resistance: 20 Years of Struggle Supported by Young East Timorese,” in \textit{It’s Time to Lead the Way: Timorese People Speak About Exile, Resistance and Identity}, ed. East Timor Relief Association (Collingwood: East Timor Relief Association, 1996), 118.} 
\footnote{79}{Interview with Eladio Faculto (19/7/2001); Interview with Gregorio Saldanha (18/4/2001).} 
\footnote{80}{Often known by his resistance name, \textit{la sama}, literally meaning “not to be downtrodden”. The other nine founders were: Dr Lucas da Costa, Jose Ave Maria Gonçalves, Julio Abel, Marciano Garcia, João Araujo, Adolpho Fontes, João Cardozo, Carlos Lopes and Agapito Cardozo: Interview with Fernando de Araujo (April 2001).} 
\footnote{81}{With the exception of the West Timorese capital Kupang: Interview with Rui Castro (24/7/2001). In Yogyakarta, for example, it was founded in 1988 by three members, growing to 28 by 1990: Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001).} 
\footnote{82}{The reasons for Suharto taking this step are unclear, although it may have been to break up the military rackets that dominated the East Timorese economy: Geoff Gunn, \textit{East Timor and the United Nations: The Case for Intervention} (Lawrenceville, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 1997), 30-35.} 
\footnote{83}{Gomes, "Resistance: 20 Years of Struggle Supported by Young East Timorese", 118.}
The first public demonstration in East Timor since the invasion of 1975 was small in size and happened quickly. It coincided with the mass celebrated by Pope John Paul II at Tasi Tolu, near Dili, on 12 October 1989. According to Constâncio Pinto’s account of the demonstration, at the end of the mass, a group of around 100 Catholic Scouts ran to the front of the crowd of 100,000 and unfurled banners and shouted slogans. Few people in the crowd joined in, because of their fear of what would follow. The Indonesian military quickly took the Pope away, stopped the demonstration and later arrested and tortured suspected organisers. The demonstration had a profound impact internationally, as the Pope was the first high-profile visitor to East Timor and was accompanied by a large media contingent.

The demonstration also had a lasting effect on the new generation. Most of the student and youth leaders I interviewed claimed to have been involved, although from Constâncio Pinto’s account this seems impossible. It seems more likely that some youth who witnessed the demonstrations felt that they had participated through their presence. The protest undoubtedly gave inspiration and confidence to youth and students to resist occupation. It marked the beginning of a period when, as Jose Antonio Belo describes, ‘people opened their minds’, and resistance activities increased dramatically.

An indication of the growing confidence of new generation activists was the second public demonstration, which occurred three months after the Pope’s visit to East Timor, with the visit of US ambassador John Monjo to Dili. Demonstrators reportedly met with then Governor Mario Carrascalão and some military figures to inform them of the demonstration. Although the demonstration was again small, this time it lasted several hours. At around noon on 17 January 1990, a group of between 80 and 90 youths entered the Hotel Turismo, met Monjo, and presented him with gifts and a petition. Although Monjo did not support the demands of the demonstrators, he

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85 José Manuel Fernandes and Donaciano Gomes were detained without trial until February the following year: *Ibid.*
86 For example, Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001); Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Elda Guterres Silva (19/7/2001).
87 Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001).
89 My account of this demonstration comes from two main sources: Pinto and Jardine, *East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance*, 115-8 and Interview with Augusto Mausiry (21/7/2001).
90 Interview with Augusto Mausiry (21/7/2001).
sought assurances about their safety and stayed with them until four o’clock. When he left, the demonstrators were beaten and two died. In the aftermath of the demonstration the organisers had to move from house to house and seek protection from Bishop Belo.\(^91\)

Another indication of the increase in new generation activism and confidence was the formation of new organisations following these demonstrations. These new organisations were also substantially bigger upon formation than those that preceded them: rather than a small cell formed by friends, it appears that whole neighbourhoods were coming together. One of these was the Always United Front Of Timor (FITUN), which was set up on 20 April 1990 by forty-nine youths from the Kuluhun area of Dili in a midnight ceremony including a flag raising and drinking of blood, a traditional Timorese oath of loyalty.\(^92\) Another was the Union of East Timorese youth (UJTL), which was set up in 1990 by seventy-five members in six of East Timor’s thirteen districts.\(^93\) Others included Sagrada Familia, or Sacred Family, and the Association of Anti-Indonesia Youth and Students (HPPMAI).\(^94\) In addition to these new groups, the organisation of the resistance as a whole improved markedly during this time when, in July 1990, leaders of various underground groups met and formed the Executive Committee of the CNRM Clandestine Front,\(^95\) with Constâncio Pinto as secretary.\(^96\) All organising at this time remained at the direction of Falintil and activities generally combined providing direct assistance to Falintil, with more urban-based resistance.\(^97\)

The largest action of the newly expanded and co-ordinated student and youth resistance was to have been a demonstration planned to coincide with the visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation in 1991. The clandestine movement throughout East Timor had prepared extensively for the visit, and in response the Indonesian

\(^{91}\) Interview with Augusto Mausiry (21/7/2001).
\(^{93}\) Interview with Octavio da Conceição (12/4/2001).
\(^{94}\) It would later change its name to the Association of Anti-Integration Youth and Students: Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000).
\(^{95}\) CNRM, the National Council of Maubere Resistance, was the resistance umbrella organisation.
\(^{96}\) Pinto and Jardine, East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance, 123-24.
\(^{97}\) For example, Sagrada Familia had a three-part programme consisted of acting as a reserve force for Falintil, providing arms and medicine for Falintil, and producing propaganda, which included such diverse activities as conducting demonstrations and sending documents overseas to the diplomatic front of the resistance: Interview with Ricardo da Costa Ribeiro (12/7/2001). UJTL focused on infiltrating the Indonesian military intelligence: Interview with Octavio da Conceição (12/4/2001).
military began a campaign of repression of suspected activists.\textsuperscript{98} As a result, twenty-five youths sought refuge in the Motael Church in Dili, under the leadership of Augusto Mausiry.\textsuperscript{99} In late October, the delegation was cancelled, and the Indonesian military stepped up its actions against now vulnerable activists. In the early hours of 28 October, the Indonesian military attacked the Motael Church, arrested most of the youths inside, and killed one, Sebastião Gomes.\textsuperscript{100} The next morning, the news spread quickly, in part because of a government ceremony nearby that many youth and students were forced to attend which was commemorating, ironically, Indonesian National Youth Day. A large crowd quickly gathered at the church.\textsuperscript{101}

On 12 November 1991, two weeks after the killing, a demonstration was organised to coincide with the traditional laying of flowers on the grave and with the presence in Dili of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Pieter Kooijmans. The demonstration was organised, at Xanana Gusmao’s request, under the banner of OJETIL, led by Gregorio Saldanha.\textsuperscript{102} A crowd of between three and five thousand gathered at Motael Church for mass and marched to Santa Cruz cemetery. When the demonstration reached Santa Cruz cemetery, the military opened fire with no warning. American journalist Alan Nairn’s described it as ‘purely and simply, mass murder … a massacre of unarmed, defenceless people.’\textsuperscript{103} Thousands fled over the walls of the cemetery. Many of the wounded, who remained in the cemetery, were

\textsuperscript{98} Pinto and Jardine, \textit{East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance}, 182.

\textsuperscript{99} Augusto Mausiry is often known is Julião Mausiry or Metan Zebra. Mausiry was given this responsibility by the parish priest: Interview with Augusto Mausiry (21/7/2001). Constâncio Pinto is somewhat critical of the conduct of the youths in the compound: Pinto and Jardine, \textit{East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance}, 182.

\textsuperscript{100} Augusto Mausiry describes standing in front of Gomes and just avoiding the gun. Interview with Augusto Mausiry (21/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Gregorio Saldanha (18/4/2001). Eladio Faculto says that OJETIL did not change its name to OJETIL under after Santa Cruz: Interview with Eladio Faculto (19/7/2001). Pinto also described Saldanha as the main organiser, although does not mention OJETIL or OJETIL by name: Pinto and Jardine, \textit{East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance}, 200.

beaten to death, while others were later taken from hospital or their homes and killed. East Timorese researchers later compiled a list of 271 killed and 270 disappeared.\(^{104}\)

In response to the massacre, East Timorese students held their first demonstration in Jakarta. Renetil had planned a demonstration to coincide with the stopover of the Portuguese Parliamentary delegation in Indonesia before its cancellation. A week after the massacre, on 19 November, Renetil decided to conduct a demonstration anyway. Each Renetil region was asked to delegate a small number of members to attend. Yogyakarta, for example, sent eight. The demonstration took place outside the office of the United Nations office in Jakarta, and all seventy-two protestors were arrested while crossing the road outside the Japanese embassy.\(^{105}\)

In analysing the Santa Cruz massacre, historians have generally noted its significance in exclusively international terms. Certainly, the footage shot by journalists present at the massacre placed the issue of East Timor back on the international diplomatic and human rights agenda. The impact that the massacre had on the East Timorese has been grossly underestimated in its dominant historiographical understanding.\(^{106}\) While it is certainly true that other massacres took more lives than Santa Cruz, notably the massacre in Kraras, near Viqueque, in August 1983,\(^{107}\) from my interviews with student and youth leaders, it was clear that no other event in East Timorese history had such a defining effect on the new generation as the Santa Cruz massacre. As with other defining events like the assassination of John F Kennedy, each person I interviewed told me their personal account of the incident, whether it consisted of their experiences at the cemetery, friends and family they lost there, or where they were when they heard the news.

12 November was a pivotal moment in East Timorese history. For new generation activists, both the demonstration and the massacre were extraordinary events regardless of the presence of foreign video cameras. Firstly, as Eladio Faculto

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\(^{104}\) The list of 271 killed, 278 wounded, 103 hospitalized and 270 disappeared was compiled by 72 researchers in East Timor following the massacre. These figures are generally cited in credible accounts of the massacre: see, for example *Ibid.*; Birmingham, “Appeasing Jakarta.”: 32.

\(^{105}\) Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001).


\(^{107}\) Over one thousand people died in this massacre: Taylor, *Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*, 142.
notes, 12 November was the ‘culminating point’ of the so-called intifada,\textsuperscript{108} both in terms of the size and sentiment of the demonstration. In the two demonstrations before Santa Cruz, only 100 people had participated. On November 12, up to five thousand joined the demonstration, despite the fact that many people did not know about the demonstration until the day before.\textsuperscript{109}

The massacre can therefore be viewed as a response by the repressive Indonesian ‘state apparatus’\textsuperscript{110} to the extraordinary movement, two years in the making, that led from the events of Tasi Tolu to those of Santa Cruz. The killing at Santa Cruz was followed by a period of military terror throughout the country. Student activist João Sarmento, then living in a seminary near the Santa Cruz cemetery, describes being so afraid of being attacked by the military that for eight months he slept during the day, stayed awake at night and missed school. This behaviour was not unusual at the time.\textsuperscript{111} Another student, living at a seminary in Los Palos, described military surrounding the school as they prayed for those killed on 12 November. The military reportedly stated that it would only take two minutes to kill them all.\textsuperscript{112}

The repression was specifically aimed at destroying the movement, as well as creating an atmosphere of general terror. Gregorio Saldanha, the main organiser of Santa Cruz, was arrested in its aftermath and sentenced to life in prison for subversion. Constâncio Pinto was forced to flee East Timor in May 1992 after the rest of the executive of the clandestine front had been arrested. Fernando de Araujo was also arrested, along with most of the leadership of Renetil. Jose Antonio Neves, who was elected as his replacement, was also arrested within four months of taking up the position.\textsuperscript{113} Finally, on 20 November 1992, Xanana Gusmão was arrested in Dili. Although the trials of the leaders proved an inspiration to the movement and attracted international attention,\textsuperscript{114} the cost was great. Many of the leaders remained

\begin{footnotes}
\item[108] Interview with Eladio Faculto (19/7/2001), 176.
\item[109] Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001).
\item[111] Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).
\item[112] Lindo Miranda Pinto, Personal Communication, 2001.
\item[113] Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001).
\item[114] Many of the defences have been published. See, for example, Xanana Gusmao and East Timor Relief Association, A Travesty of Justice: Xanana’s Defence (Fairfield, NSW: East Timor Relief Association, 1996);
\end{footnotes}
imprisoned until 1998 or 1999. With the highly clandestine structure the movement had necessarily developed, information was centralized in the hands of few people. Many organisations effectively ceased to function. There was not to be a demonstration larger than ten people until 1994.

Although it nearly destroyed the new generation resistance movements in the short term, Santa Cruz became the most powerful symbol of the new generation nationalist movement and would help to give the movement irresistible momentum in the years that followed. 12 November joined and then overtook old generation dates such as 28 November and 7 December as the most important to be commemorated each year. Eladio Faculto describes all future youth resistance as ‘carrying forward the aspiration of 12 November’. Nowhere is this aspiration better represented than in the term loriku aswa’in, literally the lorikeet warriors. This was the name by which those that participated in the 12 November demonstration became known, and which came to represent all new generation activism.

THE RETURN OF THE LORIKEET WARRIORS

After Santa Cruz, the resistance structures were rebuilt slowly until 1994, when the movement re-emerged publicly in both East Timor and other parts of Indonesia. The emphasis on demonstrating to an international audience continued, with demonstrations coinciding with the increasingly frequent visits of international dignitaries to East Timor and invasions of foreign embassies in Jakarta. A distinctive


At the beginning of his imprisonment, Gregorio Saldanha predicted that he would be free and the struggle won within ten years: he was released after East Timor had voted for independence, eight years into a life term; Interview with Gregorio Saldanha (18/4/2001). Fernando de Araujo was released in early 1998, Xanana Gusmão, moved to house arrest in early 1999, also remained in custody until after the 30 August ballot.

In the case of Renetil, Fernando de Araujo and Xanana Gusmão had centralized communication, and so links had to be re-established between the new leader of Falintil, Konis Santana, and Renetil’s new leadership: Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001).

Renetil was effectively “stagnant” until new links with Falintil could be built: Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001). Although OJETIL continued to exist, its activities were limited and many thought it had disappeared: Interview with Gregorio Saldanha (18/4/2001).

Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001).

28 November was the date of the Fretilin Declaration of Independence in 1975. 7 December was the date of the full-scale Indonesian invasion in 1975.

Interview with Eladio Faculto (19/7/2001), 225.

This is shown by its appearance in the names the two largest youth organisations founded after 12 November 1991: OPJLATIL and Presidium Juventude Lorico Aswa’ in. I am indebted to João da Silva Sarmento for pointing the significance of this term to me: Joao da Silva Sarmento, Email, 17/9/2001.
new approach also appeared, primarily through the actions of East Timorese students in Indonesia. This was to focus on the struggle on Indonesia: using Indonesian institutions to bring down the Suharto regime.

The movement in East Timor was rebuilt on a similar model to before Santa Cruz. The major influences in this rebuilding were Falintil commanders David Alex and Konis Santana, who took over from Xanana Gusmão, and Laran Sabalae, the head of the clandestine front. By 1994, many of pre-existing old groups had rebuilt and new groups had formed. Many of these were small with individual links to Falintil. The major new organisation of the resistance was the Popular Organisation of East Timorese Youth Lorikeet Warriors (OPJLATIL), which was formed in 1995 under the leadership of Vasco da Gama and Alex Cobra. Demonstrations aimed at an international audience continued as they had before Santa Cruz. In June 1994, the first demonstration of more than ten people since 1991 was held to coincide with the visit to Dili of a Catholic cardinal. Other notable demonstrations coincided with the Tripartite negotiations on East Timor between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations, and the visit to East Timor by UN Special Envoy on East Timor Jamsheed Marker in March 1997.

Demonstrations became an increasingly spontaneous expression of the feelings of the East Timorese and defence of their national identity. The commemorations of 28 November, 7 December and 12 November became increasingly important. Other demonstrations often took the form of a defence of Catholicism: in 1994, demonstrations were held after a nun was harassed; in 1995, following the desecration of the host in a Catholic church, mosques and Protestant churches were burnt throughout East Timor, notably in the Bobonaro and Viqueque districts. As well as through the defence of Catholicism, dissatisfaction with Indonesian rule was frequently expressed by attacks on Indonesian migrants at this

122 None of these three survived: Santana died in 1997 after falling down a cliff while sick; Sabalae was captured and killed by the Indonesian military mid 1995; Alex suffered the same fate on 5 June 1997: Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001); Taudevin, East Timor: Too Little Too Late, 59.
124 Interview with Augusto Mausiry (21/7/2001).
125 Interview with Nelson Belo (28/10/2000); Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001).
time.\(^{128}\) After East Timorese bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo received the Nobel Peace Prize along with the leader of the diplomatic front, José Ramos Horta, an estimated 200,000 people lined the streets to welcome him back to East Timor. An Indonesian corporal attempted to assassinate the Bishop and was beaten to death by the crowd, leading to a significant crackdown by the Indonesian military.\(^{129}\)

Tertiary students in East Timor continued to emerge as a focus for resistance and demonstrations. Tertiary education continued to expand in East Timor, and by 1998 there were five institutions and more than five thousand tertiary students.\(^{130}\)

While UNTIM and the Dili Polyteknik in particular had always been centres for clandestine organising, it was not until June 1994 that the first demonstration at UNTIM was held. From that time onwards, frequent demonstrations were held on campus.\(^{131}\) While some of the members of the official university senate participated in the resistance, there was no large student organisation separate from youth groups and other resistance organisations.\(^{132}\)

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\(^{128}\) Indonesian-owned shops were burnt in Dili in 1994 and Dili’s largest market in 1995 Market stalls owned by migrants from Sulawesi were also burnt in Baucau around this time: Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Martinkus, *A Dirty Little War*, 8; Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom*, 217.

\(^{129}\) See, for example, Martinkus, *A Dirty Little War*, 2.

\(^{130}\) These were: UNTIM, with 3,500 students, the Dili Polyteknik in Hera, with 400 students, the Economic School, with 700 students, and the Health Academy, Primary Teaching Training College and the Pastoral Institute, which each had less than 200 students: Armindo Meia, *Personal Communication*, 6/7/2001.

\(^{131}\) In August and November of that year, further demonstrations were held there, the first to coincide with the visit to campus of a Japanese delegation, the second commemorating the Santa Cruz massacre: Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001); Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000).

\(^{132}\) The leaders at the University included Jose Antonio Belo, who was arrested and tortured several times, Vasco da Gama of OPJLATIL, Ricardo da Costa Ribeiro of *Sagrada Familia* and Antonio Cardozo, who would later become a lecturer there, while deputy-rector Armindo Meia was also supportive of student activism: Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001); Interview with Nelson Belo (28/10/2000); Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Antonio Cardozo Caldas Machado (9/7/2001); Interview with Ricardo da Costa Ribeiro (12/7/2001).
THE ‘INDONESIANISATION’ OF THE STRUGGLE

The East Timorese tertiary student movement in Indonesia re-emerged in November 1994 with very public demonstrations that embarrassed Indonesia on the international stage.\textsuperscript{133} The first of these was on 12 November 1994, when the anniversary of Santa Cruz coincided with the arrival of US President Bill Clinton in Jakarta for the APEC summit.\textsuperscript{134} The Indonesian government boasted that Jakarta was protected from demonstration or attack by some fourteen thousand troops. On 12 November, seventy-eight demonstrators attempted to enter the US embassy in Jakarta. Forty-nine were arrested before they reached the embassy, while the other twenty-nine jumped the walls, stayed there for twelve days with great publicity, and then were granted temporary asylum in Portugal.\textsuperscript{135}

Students in Indonesia also took the lead in new forms of resistance that specifically focused on and targeted Indonesia. To achieve this, Renetil adopted two main strategies. The first was what Joaquim Fonseca describes as the ‘Indonesianisation’ of the East Timor conflict.\textsuperscript{136} Realizing that the Suharto regime was responsible for many of East Timor’s problems, and that it was necessary to challenge the regime throughout Indonesia, Renetil members approached Indonesian groups in relation to the issue of East Timor and to co-operate with their general activities.\textsuperscript{137} The second strategy was to make IMPETTU,\textsuperscript{138} the official government association of East Timorese students, into a pro-independence organisation: a process Mariano Sabino Lopes describes as ‘using the weapons and ammunition given by the Indonesian government to shoot them.’\textsuperscript{139} The first public manifestation of the success of these two strategies was the demonstration of 7 December 1995,
when East Timorese students from Renetil and AST, the Socialist Association of East Timor, held large demonstrations simultaneously at the Dutch and Russian embassies in Jakarta. For the first time, Indonesian pro-democracy activists and East Timorese students demonstrated together, and for the first time the IMPETTU name was used at a major demonstration.

The politicisation of IMPETTU had been a strategy of Renetil since its inception. In Denpasar, the birthplace of Renetil, all IMPETTU leaders after 1989 were Renetil members. In 1993 and 1994, after Renetil activists won several IMPETTU elections, the Indonesian military (who frequently filled the role of official advisors to IMPETTU) and the then governor of East Timor, Abilio Osorio, began to veto who could run as candidates for IMPETTU leadership positions. This strategy failed and in 1996, as part of Renetil’s strategy, IMPETTU chapters began to change their official statutes and political programmes to become openly pro-independence. Free elections were held, further increasing the influence of Renetil on IMPETTU. In September 1996, IMPETTU chapters across Indonesia began to cooperate with each other under the co-ordination of Renetil Vice Secretary General Mariano Sabino Lopes.

Although IMPETTU continued to publicly advocate independence, political activity remained very dangerous. In March 1997, when Jamsheed Marker visited Jakarta en route to East Timor, a group of Renetil members entered the Austrian embassy. The demonstrators successfully demanded that that Marker meet with Xanana Gusmão. Following the demonstration, more than twenty Renetil members

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140 AST (later PST, the Timorese Socialist Party) is a leftwing group that split from Fretilin in 1988, in disagreement with the decision to form CNRT, and took a different approach to various policies, including supporting the overall leadership of CNRT. It also advocated confronting, not subverting IMPETTU: George J. Aditjondro, "Self-Determination under Globalisation: Timor Loro Sa'e's Transformation from Jakarta's Colony to a Global Capitalist Outpost." (paper presented at the Protesting Globalisation: Prospects for Trans-National Solidarity Conference, University of Technology, Sydney, 10-11 December 1999), 5-6.

141 These demonstrations involved more students than those that preceded them. There were 56 demonstrators from Malang (East Java) at the Russian embassy alone, even though there was still a limited number of students able to attend, for safety and logistical reasons. Central Leadership Council of IMPETTU, "DPP IMPETTU: Reflection and Perspective" (paper presented at the IMPETTU General Meeting of Members, Dili, East Timor); Interview with Miguel Manetelu (20/7/2001); Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).

142 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001); Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).

143 Interview with Miguel Manetelu (20/7/2001).

144 For example, in 1994, Malang (East Java) Renetil leader member Mariano Sabino Lopes, who had won the IMPETTU election in 1992, was removed from the election, ostensibly because he had not completed enough semesters of his degree: Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).

145 Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).

146 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001); Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
were arrested and held without charge for two weeks. Rather than charge them, as punishment for ‘rejecting’ Indonesia, the government took away their Indonesian identity cards and all other benefits of citizenship, and never returned them.

In the face of such danger, student leaders were able to use IMPETTU to organise allowable student events which Renetil, as a clandestine organisation, used as cover for more subversive activities. An example of this was the inaugural Nobel Cup of December 1996, held following the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos Horta. While IMPETTU brought East Timorese students from throughout the archipelago together for games, seminars and a cultural festival, Renetil was able to organise a series of political meetings.

The strategy that was to have the greatest impact on the East Timorese struggle was the alliance formed with the Indonesian democracy movement to oust Suharto. This relationship was as old as the Indonesian student movement for democracy itself. The movement had re-emerged from a decade or more of inactivity at the same time that Renetil was founded, in late 1988, and slowly built itself into a movement distinctive from earlier student movements in the years that followed. Amongst what Edward Aspinall described as the ‘popular-radical’ wing of the movement, the two major organisations to emerge were the People’s Democratic Union (PRD) and Student Solidarity for Democracy (SMID). It was with this wing of the Indonesian student democracy movement that the East Timorese students collaborated in the demonstrations in 1995 and afterwards. In fact, the PRD and

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147 The Indonesian authorities had guaranteed the students freedom of passage out of the embassy as part of negotiations with the Austrian diplomats. This promise was not honoured.
148 Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001). Two other students died in a motorcycle accident after the demonstration: Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001). At least one student was made to return to East Timor by his parents after they saw him on television at the demonstration. In East Timor, he continued to work with Renetil: Interview with Rigoberto Monteiro (6/7/2001).
149 In 1996, Renetil had reorganised into three chapters. The first was located in Indonesia and led by Joaquim Fonseca, with Mariano Sabino Lopes as his deputy. The second was located East Timor, led by Antonio Conceição, who had returned from Indonesia in 1991, and co-ordinated with Falintil, the Clandestine Font and various youth groups. The third, overseas, led by Carlos da Silva Lopes, was mostly made up of those students who had been granted asylum in Portugal after entering embassies, although it later spread to other countries. Fernando de Araujo, imprisoned in Cipinang with Xanana Gusmão, continued to lead the movement, as the rest of the Renetil leadership was able to communicate with him and with Gusmão. Aditjondro, “Self-Determination under Globalisation”, 12; Interview with Antonio Conceicao (11/4/2001); Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001).
150 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001); IMPETTU, “DPP IMPETTU: Reflection and Perspective”; Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
152 The PRD later became the People’s Democratic Party.
SMID launched an East Timor solidarity movement, the Indonesian People’s Solidarity with the Maubere People (SPRIM), an issue for which there had previously been little overt support.153

The role of East Timorese students in the Indonesian pro-democracy movement has been largely ignored in recent works on the subject.154 Anders Uhlin, noting the change in attitude on the question of East Timor in the Indonesian pro-democracy movement, attributes it to the adoption of democratic ideas from abroad, because ‘it wouldn’t have happened otherwise’.155 On the basis of the interviews I conducted, it seems clear that the change was largely due to the involvement of East Timorese students in the pro-democracy movements.156 Furthermore, at least from the point of view of East Timorese students, their influence extended far beyond simply raising the issue of East Timor. East Timorese students were among the founders of SMID, and this trend continued elsewhere. Joaquim Fonseca notes that: ‘in the campuses where we were present, the East Timorese students then became the core of the movement for democracy. I mean, it is not exaggerating: that was the fact, that was the reality.’157

East Timorese students also aimed to make this movement more militant. At demonstrations where Indonesian students wanted no violence, IMPETTU leader Mariano Sabino Lopes says that East Timorese students would throw stones and burn images of President Suharto, provoking a reaction from the military, and taking the demonstrations and the movement to a different level.158 Renetil Indonesia leader Joaquim Fonseca does not necessarily agree that East Timorese students deliberately caused trouble, but says that trouble was inevitable at these demonstrations because of the presence of military and police. Fonseca says that the increasing militancy of the

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156 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001); Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001). James Goodman also infers that this is the reason: Goodman, "Indonesians for East Timor": 15.

157 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001), 357.

158 Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
movement was a result of the process of confronting the police and military. As he puts it:

In facing those kinds of cases, the East Timorese are much more experienced with what they have gone through in East Timor, and in many cases they want to stay and fight the police while the Indonesian students, in the first demonstrations, just ran away. But they started to learn that men’s hearts are not made of rock, and if they stay then actually than can do something.\textsuperscript{159}

By May 1998, the Indonesian economy had collapsed and the corruption, collusion and nepotism of President Suharto’s regime were becoming increasingly difficult for the international and domestic audiences to ignore or tolerate. At this time, Indonesian students became one of the most powerful forces in Indonesian politics. In May, massive demonstrations culminated with the occupation of the Indonesian parliament. East Timorese students participated, carrying the flag under which Fretilin declared independence in 1975.\textsuperscript{160} On 21 May, Indonesian President Suharto resigned. He was replaced by his deputy, Jusuf Habibie, a non-military leader with no particular attachment to East Timor.

\textsuperscript{159} Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001), 235.
\textsuperscript{160} Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
REFORMASI TO REFERENDUM:
‘AUTONOMY NO! INDEPENDENCE YES!’\textsuperscript{161}

The period of from 21 May 1998 to 30 August 1999 saw remarkable progress in the East Timorese nationalist struggle. The fall of Suharto assisted the spread of reformasi (reform) throughout Indonesia. In East Timor, reformasi enabled open political expression and organisation for the first time since 1975. On 9 June 1998, new Indonesian President Habibie offered East Timor ‘special autonomy’, in exchange for recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. Following rejection by East Timorese resistance leaders and people alike,\textsuperscript{162} the autonomy package was discredited as a solution to the East Timor ‘problem’.

On 27 January 1999, the mid point of this period in both temporal and political senses, two significant events took place. Firstly, in Jakarta, the Indonesian government announced that if the East Timorese people rejected the offer of special autonomy, they could have independence. Secondly, in Dili, pro-autonomy paramilitary groups fired shots. The activities of these groups had been steadily increasing in the second half of 1998, but these shots, the first in Dili since the fall of Suharto,\textsuperscript{163} marked the end of the openness of the reformasi period. These two moments prepared the path for what was to follow in the next seven months. While the UN would arrive to organise a referendum and East Timor would finally exercise its right to self-determination, pro-autonomy military and paramilitary terror would engulf the country. The resistance would effectively be prevented from campaigning openly in the lead-up to the ballot. While the referendum itself would pass in relative peace, threats of what the military and militias would do in the event of a vote for independence overshadowed the ballot itself.

Student and youth leaders gave two different explanations of the role of the new generation in this period. According to the first, the new generation movement remained under the strict control of Xanana Gusmão and other old generation leaders.

\hspace{\stretch{1}}\textsuperscript{161} “Students from Manufahi Conduct Free Speech Dialogue in Turiscai: Autonomy No! Independence Yes!,” Solidaritas / Solidariedade 1998.

\hspace{\stretch{1}}\textsuperscript{162} Dialogues in every district of East Timor conducted by student and youth groups overwhelmingly rejected autonomy and called for a referendum. See below.

\hspace{\stretch{1}}\textsuperscript{163} Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).
The new generation were ‘instruments of the resistance … of Xanana’\(^{164}\), the ‘\textit{pião avançado}’,\(^{165}\) the advanced pawns shielding the higher ranks as in a chess game. According to the second explanation, new generation activism in this period differed substantially from what preceded it, with a new mission, and more independence in decision making.

These two explanations reflect an increasing divergence between university students, on the one hand, (‘students’) and high school students and non-student youth on the other (‘youth’). It was student organisations that became more independent in making decisions about their activities. In these activities students increasingly focused on issues beyond immediate national liberation, such as gender, human rights, democracy and economic development. It was students who, in interviews, stressed the independent and particular nature of the new generation movement during this period. However, to describe either a single movement or historical interpretation common to all East Timorese students would be an oversimplification. In an organisational sense, students were still quite strongly divided between those who studied in Indonesia and those who studied in East Timor. The explanations students gave of their role in this period varied quite dramatically within each organisation.\(^{166}\)

The most remarkable feature of new generation activism in this period was the ability of activists to overcome this diversity within the movement. In spite of the different organisations and approaches, the new generation united at the key moments to do what was necessary. In addition to putting aside their differences, new generation activists took incredible personal risks, and many sacrificed their lives. The result was that they became the motor in the journey towards self-determination and independence.

\(^{164}\) Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001). In Tetum, Mariano Sabino Lopes uses the term \textit{sassan}, meaning thing, resource or instrument. In Indonesian he uses the term \textit{alat}, meaning tool, device or instrument.


\(^{166}\) Joaquim Fonseca and Mariano Sabino Lopes, two of the senior leaders of Renetil, gave strongly contrasting accounts, as did Antero Benedito da Silva and Nelson Belo, both central figures in ETSSC: Interview with Nelson Belo (28/10/2000); Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001); Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
REFORMASI: AUTONOMY NO!

Following the fall of Suharto, new organisations were put in place in order to capitalize on the opportunity given to the resistance. In Indonesia, Renetil Indonesia co-ordinator Joaquim Fonseca and IMPETTU leader Mariano Sabino Lopes called their regional leaders to meetings. Renetil formulated a strategy for IMPETTU to execute. The result of the meeting was that on 6 June 1998, at a mass meeting of members, the IMPETTU chapters united to form the IMPETTU Central Leadership Council (DPP IMPETTU), through which all chapters were put under the direction of a central council, led by Mariano Sabino Lopes.

In East Timor too a new student organisation emerged. On 8 June, following a week of meetings attended by leaders of most major student and youth groups and students from all tertiary institutions in East Timor, the East Timor Student Solidarity Council was formed. Antero Benedito da Silva was elected leader. In many respects, the Student Solidarity Council represented a new kind of new generation organisation. It was not a resistance group in the same way as other student and youth organisations that fought for independence, but one focused on promoting peace, democracy, reconciliation and, above all, self-determination for East Timor through a referendum. Eladio Faculto of OJETIL describes the Council as a new ‘moral force [with an] academic mission’, and Jose Antonio Belo describes them as the entry of ‘new people … with a new vision.’ Its origins can be found in the increasingly autonomous university student organising that had been steadily developing since 1980s, and especially after Indonesian troops opened fire on campus on 14 November 1998. The Council also worked closely with the major youth organisations, and for

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167 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001).
168 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat IMPETTU
169 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001); IMPETTU, “DPP IMPETTU: Reflection and Perspective”, 6; Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
170 Known in Indonesian as DSMTT (Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Timor Timur) and in Tetum as KSUTL (Konsellu Solidariedade Universitaru Timor Lorosae)
171 In 1999, he would receive the inaugural International Student Peace Prize for his role. Note that this is the correct spelling of his name: Cf. Martinkus, A Dirty Little War; Taudevin, East Timor: Too Little Too Late.
172 Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001).
173 Taudevin, East Timor: Too Little Too Late, 148-9.
174 Interview with Jose Antonio Belo (10/7/2001); Interview with Eladio Faculto (19/7/2001).
175 The incident followed the commemoration of November 12: Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000).
this reason was often known as the Youth, University and High School Student Solidarity Council.\textsuperscript{176} 

New generation leaders demanded a new level of commitment from their members at this time. Mariano Sabino Lopes told members at a meeting of IMPETTU that they were ‘no longer students, but instruments of the resistance. They could not think: there was nothing they could decide for themselves’.\textsuperscript{177} All students had to give up their studies. Antero da Silva, speaking to journalists at a demonstration in June 1998, declared:

The Suharto regime has collapsed so we have to do something in this new atmosphere. The people are not scared to say they want independence through a referendum. We have stopped our studies. Maybe now we will find a new way to learn on the streets.\textsuperscript{178}

The months of June and July were marked by an unprecedented number of demonstrations of unprecedented size. After President Habibie’s offer of autonomy, students demonstrated all week and effectively took control of the campus of UNTIM in central Dili, demanding a referendum.\textsuperscript{179} After a young East Timorese, Herman dos Reis Soares was shot dead by the Indonesian military in Manatuto (east of Dili) on 16 June, the demonstrations left campus and ten thousand people marched through Dili and occupied the regional parliament.\textsuperscript{180} On 28 June, the largest demonstration of the period, estimated at thirty thousand people by some students, was held to coincide with the visit of three EU ambassadors to East Timor, far outnumbering a pro-autonomy rally held the previous day.\textsuperscript{181} This trend of demonstrations, rejecting autonomy and demanding a referendum, continued throughout July, and created an atmosphere of unprecedented freedom in Dili.\textsuperscript{182} On 12 June, the largest East Timorese demonstration ever held in Indonesia, at the Foreign Ministry building in

\textsuperscript{176} DSMPPTT (Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Pemuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur).

\textsuperscript{177} In Tetum: "la’ox estudante maybe sassan be resistencia … la iha hano in ida, la iha boit ida katak nia bele decida-an." Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001), 275.

\textsuperscript{178} Jenny Grant, "East Timor: 10,000 Rally over Student's Killing by Army," \textit{South China Morning Post}, 19 June 1998.

\textsuperscript{179} Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{180} Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Grant, "East Timor: 10,000 Rally over Student's Killing by Army".

\textsuperscript{181} Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{182} John Martinkus, a journalist returning to East Timor for the first time in 14 months, describes the change in atmosphere: Martinkus, \textit{A Dirty Little War}, 51-52.
Jakarta, was attended by 1824 IMPETTU members demanding a referendum. Indonesian police broke up the demonstration with force, the first time this had happened during the Habibie Presidency. Many IMPETTU members remained in Jakarta, and in the following the weeks demonstrated at locations including Cipinang prison, where Xanana Gusmão was being held, the Department of Justice and the UN building in Jakarta.

The different accounts of the decision-making processes for these demonstrations exemplify the difficulty in assessing the level of independence enjoyed by new generation organisations. While senior members of both the Student Solidarity Council and IMPETTU insist that nothing was done that was not directed by Xanana or another CNRT leader, others’ versions of events differ. Renetil Indonesia leader Joaquim Fonseca did not even consult the other chapters of Renetil in the decision to hold the 12 June demonstration. When the Student Solidarity Council considered holding a demonstration on 17 July, they received a message from Xanana telling them to calm the situation and only attend mass that day. At the same, José Ramos Horta sent a tape asking them to hold a huge demonstration on the 17th. The Council decided that students should stay at home.

From July, the Student Solidarity Council began to extend the atmosphere of freedom of expression and the movement for a referendum to the districts of East Timor through a series of public meetings, or dialogues. To carry out this process required consultation and cooperation with Falintil and local youth organisations and intense lobbying of the government and military. From the beginning of August, students and youths began to travel in large groups back to their districts of origin to conduct the dialogues. The first was conducted in the Ambeno enclave on 7 and 8 August 1998. During the next three months, dialogues would be conducted in all 13 of East Timor’s districts, many subdistricts and even down to a village level in some

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184 Interview with Nelson Belo (28/10/2000); Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
185 Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000).
areas. The results were unanimous: at all dialogues, huge numbers of East Timorese rejected Indonesian rule in general and special autonomy in particular, and called for a referendum.187

In the district of Bobonaro,188 in the west of East Timor, for example, students overcame government resistance to conduct a successful series of dialogues. On 14 August 1998, a convoy of 384 people from Maliana, including students, youth and others, travelled from Dili, only to be stopped by the military at Batugade. They were refused permission to travel on and forced to return to Dili.189 On 23 August a smaller group of 180 succeeded in reaching Maliana, only to be told by the Indonesian government representative that they were not permitted to conduct a dialogue. The next day, in protest against this decision, the students held a demonstration in Maliana and then proceeded to the sports field where they conducted two days of dialogue.190 Student Solidarity Council members facilitated the dialogue,191 Renetil members, who were in Maliana working with high school students, also participated,192 while local youth groups provided security.193 Local pro-integration leaders, many of whom would later head militia groups, also attended and asked questions of the students.194 More than a thousand people attended from the various sub-districts of Bobonaro and overwhelmingly demanded independence, rejected autonomy, and supported resistance leaders. Some participants raised issues of local concern, such as killings in


188 Bobonaro district is adjacent to the border with Indonesian West Timor in the centre (on the North-South axis) of East Timor. It is the fourth largest of East Timor’s thirteen districts, with a (pre-referendum) population of 100,000. It is divided into six sub-districts, and its notable towns include Maliana (the capital), Balibo, Batugade and Bobonaro: Peter Bartu, “The Militia, the Military and the People of Bobonaro,” in Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community, ed. Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen Shalom (Sydney: Pluto Press Australia, 2001), 75.

189 This process was captured on video by Australian activist and journalist Andrew McNaughton: Andrew McNaughton, “Viva Timor Leste,” (1998).

190 Interview with Fidelis Magalhaes (15/7/01); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001); Unknown, “Finally, Good Will for the Student Branch of Bobonaro: 1000 Peacefully Attend Free Speech Dialogue in Maliana”.

191 Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).

192 Interview with Domingos Caero (15/7/2001); “Finally, Good Will for the Student Branch of Bobonaro: 1000 Peacefully Attend Free Speech Dialogue in Maliana”.

193 Interview with Domingos do Calmo (16/7/2001); Interview with Fidelis Magalhaes (15/7/01).

194 Interview with Joao Evangelino (17/4/2001); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).
their villages.\textsuperscript{195} Student took the opportunity to advocate CNRT, the new resistance umbrella group, which had not yet opened an office in Maliana.\textsuperscript{196} They also discussed issues such as democracy, human rights and gender.\textsuperscript{197} In November, dialogues were held in each of the sub-districts with similar success.\textsuperscript{198} Village level dialogues were conducted by local youth organisations.\textsuperscript{199}

Another example of students raising issues beyond national liberation was the manner in which students became increasingly aware of gender issues. The most notable example of this was the women’s group that emerged from within the Student Solidarity Council on 13 October 1998, the Young Women’s Group of East Timor (GFFTL), led by Teresa Maria de Carvalho.\textsuperscript{200} Initially, the focus of the organisation was to facilitate the involvement of more women in the student movement. The success of this can be measured in the fact that, unusually, several members of the Council’s executive were women.\textsuperscript{201} Later GFFTL moved on to more independent activities. The most notable of these was the organisation of the first national conference for women in East Timor, which was held in Becora on 9 and 10 November. Again, the military tried to prevent the event from taking place, detained some of the organisers, and tried to force GFFTL to have soldiers at the venue for the ‘safety’ of participants. However, after intense lobbying, the conference went ahead with local youth groups providing security. Women from eleven of East Timor’s thirteen districts attended, and all East Timorese women’s organisations were

\textsuperscript{195} Interview with Joao Evangelino (17/4/2001); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001); “Finally, Good Will for the Student Branch of Bobonaro: 1000 Peacefully Attend Free Speech Dialogue in Maliana”.


\textsuperscript{197} Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{198} Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{199} Interview with Palmiro Pereira dos Reis (14/7/2001); Interview with Joao Evangelino (17/4/2001); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{200} Interview with Elda Guterres Silva (19/7/2001); Interview with Angelina Sarmento (14/11/2000); Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).

\textsuperscript{201} These included Angelina Sarmento and Lita Amelia: Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Angelina Sarmento (14/11/2000).
represent. During the two days of the conference, women gave testimony of the suffering they had experienced during the occupation.

The relationship between students and youth movements and the Indonesian military and paramilitary forces in East Timor would be a crucial factor in East Timor’s move towards self-determination. In 1998, relations between students and youth and the Indonesian military were marked by overwhelming confidence on the part of the young East Timorese, and it was this confidence that in part created the prevailing atmosphere of freedom. Demonstrations and dialogues publicly challenged the human rights violations that had been commonplace for much of the past twenty-five years. This confidence often became outright defiance, as in the case of the student dialogue in Maliana. Towards the end of the year, the military began to regroup, intensify its own activities and activate militia groups throughout East Timor. An example of this shift and students’ attempts to fight it was the massacre of at least fifty civilians in Alas, in the south of East Timor, in early November. Students occupied the East Timorese regional parliament and demanded to be allowed to send a delegation to investigate. This delegation, consisting of students, church and human rights representatives and foreign journalists, was shot at when it arrived in Same, the nearest large town to Alas. The following morning, in a meeting with the military commander of the town, the investigative team was accused of firing first. Elda Guterres Silva, one of the student representatives, told the commander that this could not be true, because, in her words, ‘if I had had a gun, you would be dead now.’ The delegation returned to Dili without reaching Alas.

New generation movements also intensified their diplomatic efforts, aided by their prominent status in the movement and the popular mandate for a referendum granted by the dialogues. The results of the dialogues were distributed to journalists

202 These included OMT, OPMT, and FOKUPERS.
203 Interview with Elda Guterres Silva (19/7/2001); Interview with Angelina Sarmento (14/11/2000).
204 The term militias will be used to refer to the paramilitary groups supporting autonomy that were funded, armed and directed by the Indonesian military. These included Aitarak, Mahidi, Besi Merah Putih, Halilintar, Falintil, the only armed group supporting independence, which played a largely non-combative role during this period, will be referred to by name.
205 Yayasan HAK, "Terror, Violence and Intimidation: Abri and the Pro-Integration Militia in East Timor (Report on the Human Rights Situation in East Timor for the Period January to March 1999)", (Dili, East Timor: Yayasan HAK, 1999); Martinkus, A Dirty Little War.
206 Ibid., 97.
207 Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Elda Guterres Silva (19/7/2001); Interview with Angelina Sarmento (14/11/2000).
208 Interview with Elda Guterres Silva (19/7/2001), 97.
and visiting diplomats, all of whom visited the public Student Solidarity Council secretariat in Dili.\(^{209}\) Antero Benedito da Silva was able to use the results when he travelled to Austria to take part in the All Inclusive East Timor Dialogue.\(^{210}\) Renetil and IMPETTU members also lobbied intensively in Indonesia, on campus and in the NGO community,\(^{211}\) as well as encouraging political leaders, including future presidents Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, to visit Xanana Gusmão.\(^{212}\) By the end of 1998, the autonomy offer had been discredited as a solution to the East Timor question. This was by no means due exclusively to the activities of student and youth organisation. Prominent East Timorese leaders, notably Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos Horta, had rejected the proposals from the beginning. The role of new generation activists in demonstrating the popular support that backed these leaders cannot be underestimated.

TOWARDS THE REFERENDUM: INDEPENDENCE YES!

After the announcement that East Timor could have a referendum, the new generation began to prepare to face the challenge of the campaign. In March 1999, Xanana Gusmão called new generation leaders to a meeting Jakarta. At this meeting, Xanana asked the new generation to be the ‘motor’ of the campaign, and for all the youth and student organisations to unite for this purpose.\(^{213}\) In response to this, in April, at a meeting at Yayasan HAK\(^{214}\) in Dili, fourteen youth and student organisations\(^{215}\)

\(^{209}\) Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001); Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001); "Marker Comes, ETSSC Aspirations Strengthened," Solidaritas/Solidariedade 1998.

\(^{210}\) This was a meeting of East Timorese resistance leaders and pro-integrationists, aimed at creating a way to resolve the East Timor issue: Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000).

\(^{211}\) Interview with Mica Barreto Soares (17/4/2001).

\(^{212}\) The former met with Gusmão. The latter sent an advisor: Interview with Miguel Manetelu (20/7/2001).

\(^{213}\) Octavio da Conceição describes an identical meeting on 6 February: Interview with Octavio da Conceicao (12/4/2001). I was unable to establish if this was the same meeting. It appears that there may have been some conflict between the different groups. The exact source and nature of this conflict is not clear, although I found no evidence that it extended beyond strategies for the struggle and recognition of which of OJETIL and OPJLATIL was the primary organisation of youth and students: Interview with Augusto Mausiry (21/7/2001).

\(^{214}\) The East Timorese Human Rights and Legal Aid Foundation.

formed the Presidium of Youth Lorikeet Warriors, under the co-ordination of Juvencio Martins. The most notable group to not join was the Student Solidarity Council. Leader Antero Benedito da Silva attributes this decision as necessary to avoid the ‘power politics’ that CNRT represented. This decision was a manifestation of the belief held by many students from both Renetil and the Council that the new generation nationalist movement represented a more pure struggle than that of the older generation. This notion of purity, Donald Emmerson noted in 1968, is a characteristic of student movements in many developing nations, and has been evident is several prominent student uprisings in recent times including those in China in 1989 and Indonesia in 1998. When asked about new generation nationalism, many students compared it favourably to old generation nationalism, which they regarded as driven by political parties and tainted by the brief civil war between the two largest East Timorese parties, Fretilin and UDT, in 1975. Renetil member Father Jovito Amaral says that new generation nationalist ‘belongs to the people, because we grew up suffering with the people’. Rigoberto Monteiro, also of Renetil, noted that ‘people say they died for Fretilin, I say we struggled and died for the land of East Timor, for the East Timorese – the people pushed us’. Speaking about the civil war, João Sarmento of ETSSC adds ‘the new generation are those whose hands are still clean … [the] old generation are those with blood on their hands’.

Given the strength of these sentiments, it may seem surprising that the vast majority of student activities took place under the old generation leadership of CNRT. Renetil joined Presidium, while the Student Solidarity Council, for all its claims to neutrality, worked hand-in-hand with CNRT in most areas. This emphasis on unity can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the formation of broad alliances, so-called ‘People Power’ movements, had become increasingly common among student
movements during the 1970s and 1980s, notably in South Korea, the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{224} East Timorese students came into contact with these movements in their region through organisations such as the Asian Students Association, of which Renetil was a member,\textsuperscript{225} the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET), whose conferences students attended,\textsuperscript{226} and through the coverage the movements received in the Indonesian media.\textsuperscript{227} Secondly, according to some student leaders, this unity an important factor that separated pure new generation nationalists from the old generation. ‘Youth,’ says Joaquim Fonseca, ‘have seen enough, have learnt enough to form a more nationalistic rather than a partisan view. We know, we see the effectiveness of the youth being together and fighting together.’\textsuperscript{228}

This unity was required for the central role that the new generation were to play as the ‘motor’ of the independence campaign.\textsuperscript{229} From April, East Timorese students in Indonesia began to abandon their studies and return to East Timor. Around 850 students returned in three waves, under the leadership of Mariano Sabino Lopes, and by the end of June almost all these students had returned.\textsuperscript{230} When CNRT set up its campaign planning commission, IMPETTU leader Mariano Sabino Lopes was given responsibility for political mobilisation, and Renetil leader Fernando de Araujo

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In South Korea, students, workers and the radical church formed an alliance from the 1970s, and in 1987 mobilised middle class support in their pro-democracy movement: Jan Jip Choi, "Political Cleavages in South Korea," in \textit{State and Society in Contemporary Korea}, ed. Hagen Koo and Joint Committee on Korean Studies. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 34-37. The Philippines People Power movement represented a broad alliance of students, workers, peasants, the middle class, the church and even the army. Similar alliances were formed in Burma, focusing particularly on campus and strike activity: Kurt Schock, "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma," \textit{Social Problems} 46 (1999): 359. In Indonesia towards the end of the 1980s, students increasingly turned away from the ‘elite’ issues upon which earlier generations of student activists had focused, and turned to advocating the concerns of and working with the \textit{rakyat}, or poor, particularly in the area of land disputes. Indonesian student protests in 1998 gathered the support of thousands who joined them on the street, and the middle class who supported and even fed them as the occupied parliament: Edward Aspinall, \textit{Student Dissent in Indonesia in the 1980s}, Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper N 79 (Clayton: The Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1993), 19; Anders Uhlin, \textit{Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 86.
\item Interview with Mica Barreto Soares (17/4/2001); Interview with Rigoberto Monteiro (6/7/2001).
\item Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000).
\item Anders Uhlins spends a significant amount of time analysing the coverage in the Indonesian media of other democracy movements. East Timorese activists in Indonesia and East Timor had access to the same media he discusses: Uhlin, \textit{Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World}, 168-210.
\item Interview with Joaquim Fonseca (23/7/2001), 455.
\item de Araujo, "The CNRT Campaign for Independence", 109.
\item Interview with Guilherme da Silva (6/7/2001); de Araujo, "The CNRT Campaign for Independence": Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
responsibility for social communications. The CNRT campaign was effectively run from the Renetil office. As part of Araujo’s responsibilities, Renetil members produced the CNRT newspaper, *Vox Populi*, for the duration of the campaign, and established a radio station, *Matebian Lian*. *Vox Populi* was produced from mid-August every second day for almost two weeks until militia sacked the Renetil office on 26 August. Between one and three thousand copies were printed each day and given out free in Dili and distributed to the districts. The paper reproduced speeches by CNRT leaders, and countered the misinformation produced by the pro-autonomy side. *Radio Matebian* broadcast similar material for two one-hour periods each day. The radio equipment was eventually captured and destroyed by militia in Maliana on 29 August.

The major contribution of the youth and student organisations during this period was the door-to-door campaign. Xanana Gusmão had rejected the idea of a conventional campaign, saying ‘the Maubere people already know their goals, the reasons for their struggle, suffering and death.’ Instead, the new generation would travel door-to-door, disseminating information, creating an atmosphere of stability, and avoiding conflict with pro-autonomy groups. Any other kind of campaigning would have been impossible anyway, as CNRT activities had virtually ground to a halt in the face of militia intimidation and violence. From July, students and youths began returning to their home districts. The Student Solidarity Council set up Solidarity Information Centres (CIS) in all districts, while Presidium members worked from CNRT offices, although in many places there was little or no difference. Although there is some record of disputes between different groups within Presidium

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231 de Araujo, "The CNRT Campaign for Independence," 115.
232 Ibid., 118.
233 Literally the voice of Matebian (East Timor’s second highest mountain).
234 Two different interviewees gave different responses: Interview with Guilherme da Silva (6/7/2001); Interview with Rigoberto Monteiro (6/7/2001).
235 Printing was done at *Suara Timor Timur*, despite the fact that it supported autonomy, through resistance supporters who worked there: Interview with Guilherme da Silva (6/7/2001); Interview with Eusebio Guterres (18/4/2001); Interview with Rigoberto Monteiro (6/7/2001).
236 Interview with Guilherme da Silva (6/7/2001); Interview with Eusebio Guterres (18/4/2001); Interview with Rigoberto Monteiro (6/7/2001).
237 Interview with Eusebio Guterres (18/4/2001); Interview with Rigoberto Monteiro (6/7/2001). The broadcast hours were limited out of fear that the Indonesian military would locate and capture the equipment.
238 The English term ‘door-to-door’ is used by East Timorese activists.
239 de Araujo, "The CNRT Campaign for Independence".
and the Council, or at least the people within them, it seems that these differences were put aside for the sake of winning the Popular Consultation. In some areas students were able to organise public meetings, but in others they had to travel on foot and at night.

In Bobonaro district, for example, hundreds of youths and students arrived from Dili in mid-July. Although the leadership of the students was split between the Presidium office and the Student Solidarity Council’s, the rank and file students and youth stayed together at the Don Bosco centre near the church, and there was a high level of co-ordination between the two leadership groups. Bobonaro district was one of the worst affected by military and militia violence. The official CNRT campaign in the district only lasted one day, as CNRT members were forced to go underground, while the Student Solidarity Council office was attacked on 18 August, the day after it had been officially opened. Even the door-to-door campaign was only conducted in two subdistricts. One of these was Lolotoi, south of Maliana, where twenty-nine students and youth from various organisations travelled back together and conducted voter education for almost a month. Four were killed by the militia and military. In the worst areas, like Balibo, campaign material was smuggled in by sympathetic UNAMET drivers and illiterate peasant women. In the month of the campaign and the period following the ballot, sixty-two youth and students died in Bobonaro district alone.

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241 The author attended one such meeting at a camp of internally displaced persons in Beacu near Viqueque.
243 Interview with Domingos Caero (15/7/2001); Interview with Palmiro Pereira dos Reis (14/7/2001); Interview with Joao Evangelino (17/4/2001); Interview with Fidelis Magalhaes (15/7/01); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).
244 Falintil rated it the worst district in East Timor for violence and intimidation in August: Bartu, "The Militia, the Military and the People of Bobonaro," 76.
245 Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).
246 Their names were Antonio Franca, Agusto Noronha, Mariana and Carlito: Interview with Palmiro Pereira dos Reis (14/7/2001).
247 Students built strong relations with the UN mission (UNAMET) when it arrived in June. Large numbers of students from IMPETTU and ETSSC began to work for the UN as part of a deliberate strategy to build a strong relationship with the mission and give them access to information. ETSSC used its branches in every district to assist people from every district to get work with UNAMET, and estimates it facilitated the recruitment of up to 200 local staff in this way: Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).
248 Interview with Domingos Caero (15/7/2001).
249 Interview with Domingos Caero (15/7/2001).
In the course of the campaign, students again pursued a broader programme than national liberation. During the door-to-door campaign, students raised issues such as democracy, human rights, reconciliation, economy and gender. The Student Solidarity Council and Renetil also produced magazines during this period. The Council produced Solidaritas (also called Solidariedade). Renetil produced Talitakum, which had been founded in April 1998 as an amalgamation of various underground newspapers and magazines produced throughout Indonesia. It was produced in Indonesia and also available in East Timor. In 1999, Renetil members also began producing three new titles for CNRT: Tuba, Liberta and Unidade, as well as Vox Populi. Through these magazines, student groups provided a more intellectual and analytical view of the struggle, East Timorese history, the referendum, the autonomy proposal, and challenges for a future East Timor.

The final major contribution of the new generation movement in 1999 was its reaction to the Indonesian military and militia groups. As the referendum approached, the military and militias created an atmosphere of intense terror in an effort to create the impression of civil war, prevent the resistance from campaigning and intimidate the population into voting for autonomy. The reaction of youth and student groups to this terror proved important in preventing any of these aims from being realized. Firstly, they obeyed Xanana Gusmão’s instructions to ‘behave with discipline and civility’. Secondly, they protected themselves at the most difficult times. Many youths fled from the districts to the relative safety of Dili or the mountains. While no open activity was possible, student groups prepared and planned for the campaign ahead. The Student Solidarity Council, for example, took forty students and youths who were at risk in Dili to Bali for training between the end of April and the beginning of June 1999. Thirdly, far from remaining passive, they protected the population. At night, when most militia activity took place, student and youth groups formed roadblocks. Male members of FITUN, for example, were told to stop

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250 Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Palmiro Pereira dos Reis (14/7/2001); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).
251 Interview with Guilherme da Silva (6/7/2001); Interview with Rigoberto Monteiro (6/7/2001); Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).
253 Interview with Fidelis Magalhaes (15/7/01); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001).
255 Interview with Antero Benedito da Silva (7/11/2000); Interview with Elda Guterres Silva (19/7/2001); Interview with Alfredo Martins (15/7/2001); Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).
attending school at this time so that they could guard their neighbourhoods at night.\textsuperscript{256} The Student Solidarity Council secretariat, which was well known throughout Dili and located less than a hundred metres from a militia post, was not attacked until late August because of cooperation between Council members and local youth organisations.\textsuperscript{257} In the aftermath of the ballot, as East Timor was razed to the ground, there was little anyone could do except to try and stay alive.\textsuperscript{258}

\textsuperscript{256} Interview with Elizario Ferreira (23/7/2001).
\textsuperscript{257} Interview with Joao da Silva Sarmento (24/7/2001).
\textsuperscript{258} Some new generation activists committed acts of incredible bravery during this period. Polyteknik student leader Fransisco Aparicio Guterres, for example, led a group of over seventy people through numerous militia roadblocks to safety in the mountains. All survived: Interview with Francisco Aparicio Guterres (21/11/2000). Relatively few of the new generation leadership were killed, although many had close escapes. Sadly, hundreds, if not thousands, of young people did give their lives in the final days of the occupation.
CONCLUSION

East Timor:
From you I was born
Because of you I suffered
For you I’ll die

Graffiti in Maliana, East Timor

The history of the new generation nationalist resistance is one of powerful East Timorese agency that has been largely ignored in the historiography of East Timor. In many of the defining moments in East Timor’s history, the East Timorese have generally only appeared for ‘confused and violent instants’. A closer look reveals the actions of new generation nationalists, moving East Timor along the road to national liberation. Their presence was also important in many less public ways that are not examined in this thesis.

New generation activism profoundly influenced the manner in which the world saw East Timor. Once the new generation began public demonstrations, Indonesia could not convince the world that the question of East Timor was resolved. The demonstration of October 1989 during the pope’s visit was the small, nervous beginning of a movement that would never be destroyed or ignored. The massacre of 12 November 1991 at Santa Cruz defined the issue of East Timor for many around the world. The rejection of the Indonesian military occupation of East Timor to the world continued afterwards, through the the student invasions of foreign embassies in Jakarta, the new generation-led free-speech dialogues of 1998 and the spectacular success of the pro-independence side at the referendum of 30 August 1999 which they did so much to inspire.

New generation activism also profoundly affected Indonesia. After 1994 particularly, East Timorese students used the ‘weapons and ammunition’ given to them by the Indonesian government to ‘shoot’ at their oppressors. They used their

259 Tetum: Timor Lorosa’e: Husi o ha’u moris, Tan o ha’u terus, ba o ha’u mate. See Appendix 4 for photograph.
260 McVey, Suddard, and Benda, Southeast Asian Transitions : Approaches through Social History, 2.
261 Interview with Mariano Sabino Lopes (14/4/2001), 43.
official student organisation to organise for independence and their access to Jakarta to demonstrate publicly. This outraged the Indonesian elite so much that Dr Amien Rais declared that ‘Dogs still know how to thank their masters by waving their tails’, and some activists were literally stripped of their Indonesian identities by the authorities. Finally, in co-operation with Indonesian pro-democracy activists, East Timorese students led the demonstrations that finally brought down the Suharto government and ushered in some degree of democratization.

New generation activism also had a profound impact on the East Timorese. Through their public demonstrations of nationalist sentiment, young East Timorese gave each other confidence and inspiration, until the movement had an unstoppable momentum. This is epitomised in the symbol of the ‘lorikeet warrior’, the veteran of Santa Cruz, who continued the struggle for the eight additional years it took to attain national liberation. The struggle also remained close to the rural East Timorese, a fact evident in the willingness of students to take the free speech they enjoyed to the villages, and to attempt to raise the consciousness of the people about issues such as democracy, human rights and gender.

Above all, new generation resistance was a defiance of oppression. The primary impetus for action came from the horrific experiences many suffered at the hands of the Indonesian military in childhood. Each time youth and students stepped forward, a new instance of military oppression would attempt to force them back: from 1991, when the Indonesian military attempted to end the intifada once and for all at Santa Cruz, to 1998, when the students’ unprecedented confidence was met with nationwide paramilitary repression. In spite of the risk of arrest, imprisonment, rape, torture and death, new generation resistance continued to grow. The culmination of this was the 30 August 1999, when the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence in the knowledge of the military and militia rampage that was to follow.

National liberation was the first step in the liberation of the people of East Timor. New generation activists’ awareness of this fact became increasingly apparent in 1998 and 1999, as the issues they raised extended beyond the immediate goal of independence. New generation activists undoubtedly have major roles to play in the future of East Timor. The elections of 30 August 2001 hint at the varied nature these

262 Kehi, “Education Reform in East Timor: A Philosophical View”: 7.
roles will take. Many new generation activists returned to the source and campaigned and ran with Fretilin. Others started new political parties, most notably the Democratic Party which, newly formed with a conscious emphasis on its new generation origins, has become East Timor's second largest political party. Others still have remained in civil society, continuing to advocate human rights, conflict resolution and civic education.
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

007 Early resistance group
APEC Forum Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum
Apodeti Associação Popular Democrática Timorense
Popular Democratic Association of East Timor
Indonesian-backed pro-integration party
AST Associação Socialista de Timor
Timorese Socialist Association
Later PST (Timorese Socialist Party)
BPPM Barisan Penerus Perjuagan Maubere
East Timorese youth group
CNRM National Council of Maubere Resistance
Resistance umbrella group formed in 1987
CNRT National Council of Timorese Resistance
Resistance umbrella group formed in 1998 (successor to CNRM)
DSMTT see ETSSC
ETSSC East Timor Student Solidarity Council
Known in Indonesian as DSMTT (Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Timor Timur) or DSMPPTT (Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Pedmuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur).
Known in Tetum as KSUTL (Konsellu Solidariedade Universitariu Timor Lorosae)
FITUN Frente Iha Timor Unidos Nafatin
Always United Front Of Timor
Youth organisation based in Kuluhun area of Dili
Falintil Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste
National Liberation Forces of East Timor
East Timorese resistance guerrilla army, initially aligned to Fretilin, then to CNRM and finally to CNRT.
Fretilin Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente
Revolution Front of Independent East Timor
Political party set up in East Timor in 1974.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GFFTL</td>
<td>Grupo Feto Foinsa’e Timor Lorosa’e Young Women’s Group of East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPPMAI</td>
<td>Association of Anti-Indonesia (later anti-Integration) Youth and Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imaptim</td>
<td>Ikatan Mahasiswa Pelajar Timor Timur (Kupang) East Timor Students’ Association (Kupang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPETTU</td>
<td>Ikatan Mahasiswa / Pelajar Timor Timur East Timor Students Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interfet</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSUTL</td>
<td>See ETSSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJECTIL</td>
<td>Organização da Juventude e Estudante Catolica de Timor Leste Organization of Catholic East Timorese Youth and Students. Major Fretilin youth organisation of 1980s (later known as OJETIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJETIL</td>
<td>Organização da Juventude e Estudante de Timor Leste Organization of East Timorese Youth and Students. Major Fretilin youth organisation of the 1990s (previously known as OJECTIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPJLATIL</td>
<td>Organização Popular da Juventude Loriku Aswa’in de Timor Leste The Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth Lorikeet Warriors East Timorese youth organisation formed in May 1995 (Loriku Aswa’in, literally parrot warriors, is used to refer to those who participated in the demonstration of November 12 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPJT</td>
<td>Organização Popular da Juventude Timor The Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth Fretilin youth organisation of the 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik later Partai Rakyat Demokratik People’s Democratic Union, which later became the People’s Democratic Party. Radical Indonesian organisation that worked in solidarity with East Timorese activists in Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renetil</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste National Resistance of East Timorese Students Clandestine organisation of East Timorese students studying outside East Timor (set up in 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagrada Familia</td>
<td>literally Sacred Family Clandestine resistance organisation formed following the visit to Timor of Pope John Paul II in 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMID</td>
<td>Solidaritas Mahasiswa Untuk Demokrasi Student Solidarity for Democracy. Radical Indonesian student organisation founded in 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPRIM</td>
<td>Solidaritas Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia untuk Maubere the Indonesian People’s Solidarity with the Maubere People Indonesian – East Timorese student solidarity organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>União Democrática Timorense Timorense Democratic Union Timorese political party founded in May 1974. Initially supported continued association with Portugal, before switching to supporting independence in early 1975, then supporting integration later in 1975, later returning to its pro-independence program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJTL</td>
<td>União Juventude Timor Leste Union of East Timorese youth Youth group with strong links to Fretilin central committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNETIM</td>
<td>Uniao Nacional de Estudantes de Timor National Union of Timorese Students Fretilin student organisation founded in 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTIM</td>
<td>Universitas Timor Timur University of East Timor Private University in Dili, run by the Lorosa’e Foundation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yayasan HAK</td>
<td>East Timorese Human Rights and Legal Aid Foundation, mostly set up by Renetil members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2: GLOSSARY OF SELECTED EAST TIMORESE
STUDENT AND YOUTH ORGANISATIONS

East Timor Student Solidarity Council (ETSSC)
_Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Timor Timur (DSMTT) or Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Pedmuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur (DSMPPTT)_
_Konsellu Solidariedade Universitariu Timor Lorosae (KSUTL)_

Description: Student organisation with members at all of tertiary education faculties and academies in East Timor.
Founded: 8 June 1998
Programme: 1998: Conducted demonstrations in Dili and dialogues in all 13 districts of East Timor.
1999: Conducted voter education. Opened Solidarity Information Centres (CIS) in all 13 districts.
2000-2002, João da Silva Sarmento
Executive includes: Nelson Belo, Teresa Maria da Carvalho (GFFTL Leader), Angelina Sarmento, Fransisco Aparicio Guterres (Polyteknik students leader)
Notes: Included independent Women’s Organisation GFFTL (_Grupo Feto Foinsa’e Timor Lorosa’e_)
Remained independent of CNRT youth organisation _Presidium Juventude Loriku Aswa’in._

FITUN - _Frente Iha Timor Unidos Nafatin_
Always United Front Of Timor

Description: Youth organisation based in Kuluhun / Taibesi area of Dili.
Founded: 20 April 1990 (by 49 youths in a midnight ceremony including flag-raising and drinking of blood, a traditional Timorese oath of loyalty).
Leaders: At foundation: Armando da Silva, deputy Marito Mota.
Currently: Elizario Ferreira.
Notes: Claims to be the successor of UNETIM and OPJT.

GFFTL – _Grupo Feto Foinsa’e Timor Lorosa’e_
Young Women’s Group of East Timor

Description: Women’s student organisation set up under the auspices of ETSSC
Leader: Teresa Maria de Carvalho.
Other members include Angelina Sarmento, Rosa Xavier, Rosa Fernandes, Elda Guterres Silva, Elisa Silva, Atanasia Pires, Lita Amelia.
Notes: Organised first East Timor women’s congress on 9-10 November 1998.
**HPPMAI**  
*Association of Anti-Indonesia (later anti-Integration) Youth and Students*

Description: Small youth organisation set up in the mid 1980s  
Members: Included Antero Benedito da Silva, Gregorio Saldanha, Vasco da Gama.

**Imaptim – Ikatan Mahasiswa Pelajar Timor Timur (Kupang)**  
*East Timor Students’ Association (Kupang)*

Description: Official Indonesian organisation of East Timorese students and youth in Kupang (West Timor). Later became pro-independence organisation.  
Leader: Rui Manuel Castro  
Notes: Not linked with IMPETTU or Renetil, but with East Timor-based students organisations, particularly ETSSC after 1998.

**IMPETTU - Ikatan Mahasiswa / Pelajar Timor Timur**  
*East Timor Students Association*

Description: Official Indonesian organisation of East Timorese students and youth in Indonesia under the supervision of military and government. Originally had different names in each city but all came to be known as IMPETTU. In 1996 became pro-independence under the influence of Renetil. In 1998 adopted a centralized structure called DPP-IMPETTU.  
Founded: 1980  
Programme: After 1995, included demonstrations (notably June 12 1998), Nobel Cup.  
Leaders: National co-ordinator (after 1996), Mariano Sabino Lopes. Different elected leaders in each chapter.

**OJETIL - Organização da Juventude e Estudante de Timor Leste**  
*Organisation of East Timorese Youth and Students.*

Description: Major Fretilin youth organisation. Primary organiser of November 12 demonstration.  
Leader: President: Gregorio Saldanha.  
Sec-Gen: Eladio Faculto.  
Notes: Previously known as Organisation of Catholic East Timorese Youth and Students (OJECTIL). Claims to be the continuation of UNETIM and OPJT.

**OPJLATIL - Organização Popular da Juventude Loriku Aswa’in de Timor Leste**  
*The Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth Lorikeet Warriors*
Description: East Timorese youth organisation. One of the largest organisations in the mid 1990s
Founded: May 1995 by nine members under the direction of Falintil Commander Konis Santana.
Leader: Founding leaders: Alex Cobra and Vasco da Gama
Currently: Augusto Mausiry
Notes: Had strong links with Renetil, who provided assistance to the organisation at the request of Konis Santana.

**Orgão Oito**
*Organ Eight*

Description: Early cell-based resistance group
Founded: 1985
Leaders: Included Constâncio Pinto, José Manuel Fernandes and Donaciano Gomes
Notes: Earlier known as 007

**Presidium Juventude Loriku Aswa’in**
*Presidium of Youth Lorikeet Warriors*

Description: Umbrella group of youth organisations set up under the auspices of CNRT
Founded: April 1999
Members: 14 organisations including OJETIL, OPJLATIL, Fuan Domin, Renetil, Uniamorte, Sagrada Familia, IMPETTU, FITUN, UJTL, BPPM *(Barisan Penerus Perjuagan Maubere)*

**Renetil - Resistencia Nacional dos Etudiantes de Timor Leste**
*National Resistance of East Timorese Students*

Description: Clandestine organisation of East Timorese students studying outside East Timor.
Founded: June 20 1988 in Denpasar, Bali.
Founding members: Fernando de Araujo, Dr Lucas da Costa, Jose Ave Maria Gonçalves, Julio Abel, Marciano Garcia, João Araujo, Adolpho Fontes, João Cardozo, Carlos Lopes and Agapito Cardozo.
After Araujo was arrested in late 1991, Jose Neves took over the effective leadership. After his arrest, leadership was transferred to a Presidium of 8 comprising Joaquin Fonseca, Virgilio da Silva, Benjamin Martins, Julio Jacob, Lucas da Costa, Aderito de Jesus Soares, Jose Pompeia and Antonio da Conceção. In 1996 the organisation split into 3 regions: Indonesia, East Timor and the rest of the world. The Indonesian region was led by Joaquim Fonseca, with Mariano Sabino Lopes as his deputy. The East Timor region was led...
by Antonio Conceição. The overseas region, initially located in Portugal, was led by Carlos da Silva Lopes.

Strategies: To isolate East Timorese youth from Javanese influences; to denounce to the world the crimes committed by the Indonesian regime; and to prepare professionals with revolutionary concepts for national reconstructions.

Sagrada Familia
Sacred Family

Description: Clandestine resistance organisation
Founded: Following the visit to Timor of Pope John Paul II in 1989.
Leader: Falintil commanders Rodak Rau Nabe, David Alex, El Forei Bo’ot (also known as L7), and later L4. Youth representative: Ricardo da Costa Ribeiro.
Programme: Its three-part programme consisted of acting as a reserve force for Falintil, providing arms and medicine for Falintil, and producing propaganda, which included such diverse activities as conducting demonstrations and sending documents overseas to the diplomatic front of the resistance.

UJTL - União Juventude Timor Leste
Union of East Timorese youth

Description: Youth organisation with close links to the Fretilin central committee
Founded: 1990 by 75 members in six of East Timor’s thirteen districts
Programme: Focused on infiltrating the Indonesian military intelligence.
## APPENDIX 3: TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>early 1975</td>
<td>UNETIM founded by Fretilin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late 1975</td>
<td>OPJT formed by Fretilin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 16 October</td>
<td>Indonesian troops take Balibo, near border with West Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 28 November</td>
<td>Fretilin Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 7 December</td>
<td>Full-scale Indonesian invasion of East Timor, including Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 September</td>
<td>Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 August</td>
<td>Fence of Legs Operation begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>IMPETTU founded by Indonesian government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1985</td>
<td>007 formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>HPPMAI formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 20 June</td>
<td>Renetil founded in Bali ten members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 2-3 November</td>
<td>Indonesian President Suharto visits East Timor, and subsequently announces that the province will be opened up to visitors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 12 October</td>
<td>Pope visits East Timor. First demonstrations at Mass at Tasi Tolu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 after Pope’s visit</td>
<td>Sagrada Familia formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 20 April</td>
<td>FITUN founded by 49 members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>UJTL founded by 75 members in 6 districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 12 November</td>
<td>Santa Cruz Massacre at demonstration following the killing of Sebastiao Gomes and cancellation of Portuguese Parliamentary Delegation visit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 19 November</td>
<td>East Timorese student demonstration at UN office in Jakarta following Santa Cruz massacre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 20 November</td>
<td>Xanana Gusmao arrested in Lahane, Dili.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 June</td>
<td>Demonstration at Cathedral to coincide with the visit of a Catholic Cardinal. First demonstrations larger than ten in Dili since Santa Cruz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 14 June</td>
<td>First large demonstration at UNTIM (University of East Timor), following harassment of nuns by TNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 15 August</td>
<td>More demonstrations at UNTIM to coincide with visit to campus by Japanese delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 12 November</td>
<td>Santa Cruz massacre commemorated with demonstration at UNTIM. Renetil demonstration at US embassy in Jakarta organised by Renetil. Commemoration of Santa Cruz massacre and marks visit of Bill Clinton to Indonesia. 29 Renetil members enter US embassy, then granted asylum in Portugal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 9 January</td>
<td>Tripartite meetings between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN on the future of East Timor. Demonstrations at UNTIM calling for East Timorese participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 18 May</td>
<td>OPJLATIL founded by nine members in Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 8-11 September</td>
<td>Demonstrations in Maliana, Viqueque, Dili and other areas after Indonesian military insults Catholicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 7 December</td>
<td>Demonstration at Dutch and Russian embassies in Jakarta to mark 20th anniversary of full scale invasion of East Timor by Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>IMPETTU becomes openly pro-referendum organisation. Begins to co-ordinate nationally.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996 10 December</td>
<td>Inaugural Nobel Cup organised by IMPETTU following awarding of Nobel Prize to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos Horta. Includes games, seminars, cultural festival and (clandestine) political meetings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Demonstration and assassination attempt by Indonesian military.

1997 March

1997 12 March
Demonstration at Austrian Embassy in Jakarta following visit of Jamsheed Marker (UN Special Envoy on East Timor) to East Timor. Demands that Marker meets Xanana Gusmao in Cipinang. 23 or 33 Students arrested and are stripped of Indonesian citizenship. 2 killed in motorcycle accident.

1997 14 November
Indonesian troops enter campus of UNTIM and open fire.

1998 21 May
Indonesian President Suharto resigns following a campaign of mass protest led by Indonesian students. East Timorese activists participate carrying East Timorese flags.

1998 1 June
East Timorese students hold first post-Suharto demonstration in Dili

1998 6 June
DPP IMPETTU formed
Forum on the future of East Timor is held in Dili

1998 8 June
Large student demonstration in Dili bringing together students from UNTIM, the Polyteknik and other academies for the first time. East Timor Student Solidarity Council founded. Antero Benedito da Silva leader.

1998 9 June
Indonesian President Habibie offers East Timor autonomy in return for international recognition of Indonesian sovereignty.

1998 12 June
IMPETTU holds mass demonstration outside the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in Jakarta. The demonstration is broken up by the army: the first time they have been used in such a way under Habibie.

1998 16 June
Following the death of Herman Soares in Manatuto, 20,000 students protest in Dili and occupy parliament
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998 20 June</td>
<td>IMPETTU hold demonstration at Cipinang demanding Xanana’s release. Demonstrations also follow at the Department of Justice and UN Jakarta office in the following days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 24 June</td>
<td>Mass demonstrations in Dili accompany the arrival of the Troika EU Ambassadors. One student is killed by SGI in Baucau.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998 27 June</td>
<td>Pro-integration forces hold a counter demonstration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998 July-October</td>
<td>Dialogues held by East Timor Student Solidarity Council in all 13 districts and many sub-districts and villages. Overwhelming call for a referendum and independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 11-12 October</td>
<td>Mass demonstrations and strike in Dili calling for the resignation of Governor Abilio Osorio Soares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 22 or 23 November</td>
<td>Thousands of students rally in Dili and occupy the regional parliament to coincide with the visit of Jamsheed Marker and to protest recent killings of civilians in Alas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 23 January</td>
<td>President Habibie announces a revised two options: declaring that East Timor can have independence if it rejects the Special Autonomy proposal. Following this announcement, Xanana Gusmao moved from Cipinang to house arrest in Salemba, Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 April</td>
<td>Presidium Lorico Juventude Aswa’in formed by fourteen youth groups in Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 6 April</td>
<td>Indonesian military and paramilitary groups kill approx 57 people at Liquica Church.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 17 April</td>
<td>Following a demonstration in Dili, militia forces go on a rampage, including attacking Manuel Carrascalao’s house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 May 5</td>
<td>Indonesia and Portugal sign an agreement for a referendum to be held in East Timor on the Autonomy package offered to East Timor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 June 4</td>
<td>The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) raises the UN flag in Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 August 16 (approx)</td>
<td>CNRT campaign newspaper <em>Vox Populi</em> started</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1999 August 26  Following a demonstration in Dili, militia forces go on a rampage. No further CNRT campaigning is able to take place in Dili.

1999 August 29  Radio Matebian Lian captured and destroyed in Maliana

1999 August 30  Ballot held peacefully. 98.6% of registered voters case their ballots

1999 September 4  UNAMET announces that 78% of voters rejected the Autonomy Package.

1999 September 20  First Interfet units arrive in East Timor
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